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Picketing Injunctions in California: A
Study of the Role of the Courts in
Farm Labor Disputes
By STEVEN F. SHATz*
There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more
than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or law-
ful lynching.'
Throughout the more than a century and a half of labor organizing
in this country, the invariable response to the concerted activities of
labor has been the labor injunction.2 Despite the fact that the wide-
spread use of the labor injunction has been strongly criticized by every
comnientator who has studied the question,3 the device continues to play
a significant and unfortunate role in California today.
* A.B., 1966, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1969, Harvard University.
Associate Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. In the interests of full
disclosure (see Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. Rv. 227
(1965)), it should be noted that the author has on occasion appeared as volunteer
counsel for the United Farm Workers. In particular, the author was chief counsel in
California Retail Liquor Dealers Institute v. UFW, and its derivative appellate cases,
UFW v. Superior Court, and California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. UFW, all of
which are discussed in this article. The author wishes to thank Marilyn H. Levin, a
recent graduate of the University of San Francisco School of Law, and Patricia Gates, a
current student at the School of Law, for their assistance in the preliminary research for
this article.
1. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (S.D. Iowa 1905).
2. Cases dating back to 1806 are discussed in F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE
LABOR INJUNCtION 2-5 (1930) [hereinafter cited as FRANK'muTER & GREENE].
3. 'The history of the labor injunction in action puts some matters beyond
question. In large part, dissatisfaction and resentment are caused, first, by the refusal of
courts to recognize that breaches of the peace may be redressed through criminal
prosecution and civil action for damages, and second, by the expansion of a simple,
judicial device to an enveloping code of prohibited conduct, absorbing, en masse,
executive and police functions and affecting the livelihood, and even lives, of multitudes."
Id. at 200.
"The author sees little justification for injunctions in labor disputes. Some have
undoubtedly cleared the atmosphere, prevented trouble or hastened adjustment. More
have made no particular difference. By and large, however, injunctions have not only
seriously handicapped the workingman against whom they were directed but have added
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The present article examines the role played by California courts in
labor disputes through the use of picketing injunctions. The first part
of the article briefly traces the evolution of the standard picketing
injunction in California. The second part of the article reports on a ten-
year study of 175 picketing cases brought against the United Farm
Workers of America (UFW).4 The cases studied span the period from
the beginnings of the grape strike and boycott in 1965 to the passage of
the Agricultural Labor Relations Act5 in 1975 and constitute 90 percent
greatly to the bitterness of labor disputes. As measures for the protection of property
and preservation of law and order, they have generally proved worthless." E. WrrTE,
THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES 298 (1933) [hereinafter cited as WITTE].
"The 'injunction evil,' to the extent that it may still be said to exist, lies in the
routine application of an extraordinary remedy to ordinary cases." Aaron & Levin,
Labor Injunctions in Action: A Five-Year Survey in Los Angeles County, 39 CAL. L.
REv. 42, 67 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Aaron & Levin]. "In the long run pressing
problems require solution. The labor injunction was society's way of emulating the
ostrich by sticking its head in the sand." Cox, The Role of Law in Labor Disputes, 39
CORNELL L.Q. 592, 595 (1954).
4. The picketing injunction cases brought against the UFW provide a convenient
vehicle for the study of labor injunctions in action for several reasons. First, the cases
constitute a sufficiently large sample because during the period covered there was no
administrative regulation of farm labor relations; and the cases are sufficiently similar to
afford a basis for comparison, since each involved the same defendant pursuing a limited
range of goals by similar tactics.
Second, the cases involved the full range of picketing situations (organizational,
strike, boycott, and labor camp picketing), and originated in a number of different trial
courts. The cases break down by county as follows: Alameda (4), Fresno (22),
Imperial (13), Kern (32), Los Angeles (8), Merced (2), Monterey (16), Riverside
(21), San Benito (1), San Diego (3), San Francisco (4), San Joaquin (6), San Mateo
(I), Santa Barbara (5), Santa Clara (5), Santa Cruz (2), Tulare (21), Ventura (8),
Yolo (1). See Appendix infra.
Third, the California Supreme Court recently heard three of the cases studied, and
the decisions in those cases permit consideration of the effectiveness of judicial review in
this type of case.
Finally, the author believes his own experience handling cases in the area has
provided some insights on the issues raised by the study.
5. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1140-67 (West Supp. 1976). The passage of the act
provides an appropriate end point to the study. If the act does not entirely eliminate
private picketing injunctions in farm labor disputes, it at least drastically alters the
context in which any such actions will be brought. Part of the act provides that the
exclusive remedy for unfair labor practices is through the Agricultural Labor Relations
Board. Id. § 1160.9. Union activities which in the past have generated private
injunction suits now constitute unfair labor practices. Id. § 1154. While at the federal
level, the judicially created "violence" exception to exclusive NLRB jurisdiction over
labor disputes allows state courts to enjoin "conduct marked by violence and imminent
threats to the public order," (San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
247 (1959)) this exception will probably have no counterpart in the state act because the
federal violence exception is based on two factors not relevant in the state context: the
presumed congressional intent not to occupy the field and the concern for state interests
in a federal system. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra at 247-48;
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or more of the picketing injunction cases brought against the UFW in
California. 6 The study demonstrates that the trial courts, in this class of
cases, substantially ignored the standards articulated by the legislature
and appellate courts. The third part of the article reviews the trio of
recent California Supreme Court decisions in picketing injunction cases
involving the UFW and concludes that, although the court in all three
cases upheld the contentions of the UFW and overturned actions of the
trial courts, the decisions were sufficiently narrow that they will not have
substantial effect on future trial court actions. The final section of the
article examines California's recently enacted anti-injunction statute'
and makes a number of recommendations for changes necessary to
strengthen the act in order to accomplish its purpose.
Background
Historically, the labor injunction has assumed two general
forms: one form where the objects of the union's activity were found
to be unlawful (an object injunction) and the other where the conduct
engaged in by the union in pursuit of a lawful object was found to be
unlawful (a conduct injunction). In the early days of the labor move-
ment in this country, employers were able more frequently to obtain
object injunctions, because courts held almost all concerted activity to be
illegal as a "restraint of trade," "nuisance," "interference with business,"
"interference with contract," and the like.8 Where the employer could
not convince the court that the union's objects were illegal, it could
frequently obtain a conduct injunction by alleging the union had en-
gaged in violence, threats, or fraud.9
On the national level, the excessive interference by courts in labor
disputes prompted the passage, in 1932, of the Norris-La Guardia
Electrical Workers Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740,
748-51 (1942).
Thus, the propriety of private picketing injunctions remains a live issue in nonfarm
labor disputes, but it may no longer be an issue in the farm labor context if "unlawful
conduct" for purposes of injunctive relief is read as coextensive with "unfair labor
practice" for purposes of the act and if the "exclusive" jurisdiction given to the board is
read to admit of no "violence" exception. These questions, however, are beyond the
scope of this article.
6. Time and expense considerations prevented studying the remaining cases, but
there is no reason to believe that they differ in any significant respect from the ones
studied. Cases brought under the Jurisdictional Strike Act, CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1115-22
(West Supp. 1976), which raise fundamentally different questions, were not included in
the study.
7. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 527.3 (West Supp. 1976).
8. See generally FRANKFuRTER & GREENE, supra note 2, at 1-24.
9. See WrrrE, supra note 3, at 53-54.
Act,"° which severely limited the jurisdiction of federal courts to grant
injunctions to private parties in labor disputes. The act practically
eliminated private labor injunctions in the federal courts.1 In the wake
of the federal act, many states passed "little Norris-La Guardia acts."
Although California, in 1933, enacted a statement of policy in favor of
concerted activity by workers,' 2 which statement closely paralleled the
statement of policy in the Norris-La Guardia Act, it rejected a proposed
anti-injunction statute.13 In the absence of a statute, the California
Supreme Court adopted different approaches to the two types of labor
injunctions. In 1940, in a series of cases handed down together, the
court largely barred the object injunction. The court declared the test
of a lawful object to be whether the union's "purpose is reasonably
connected with a controversy which affects workers in an industry
generally."'" It upheld picketing to obtain a closed shop,' to organize
workers who themselves had no dispute with their employer,1 6 or to
effect a secondary boycott.' 7  Although there have since been occasions
where picketing was enjoined because of its object," the bulk of the
cases coming before the California courts since that time have been suits
alleging that concerted activities have been conducted in an unlawful
manner.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
11. In 1970, the United States Supreme Court, despite the prohibitions of the
Norris-La Guardia Act, held that the act did not bar a private object injunction in the
narrow class of cases where a union struck in violation of a no-strike provision of a
collective bargaining agreement. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S.
235 (1970). But cf. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
12. CAL. LABOR CODE § 923 (West 1971).
13. Compare A.B. 315 (1933), with SENATE DAILY JOURNAL, May 10, 1933, at
2633-34; see Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Local 1172, 16 Cal. 2d 379, 385, 106 P.2d
403, 407 (1940).
14. C.S. Smith Metropolitan Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal. 2d 389, 394, 106 P.2d
414, 418 (1940).
15. McKay v. Retail Auto. Salesmen's Local 1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 106 P.2d 373
(1940).
16. C.S. Smith Metropolitan Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal. 2d 389, 392, 106 P.2d
414, 416 (1940).
17. Id. at 395, 106 P.2d at 418. The expanding scope of federal preemption under
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1970) has even further
restricted the power of the state courts to issue object injunctions in industries covered by
the act. See Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 96 S.
Ct. 2548 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Hughes v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948), aff'd,
339 U.S. 460 (1950) (picketing to compel minority hiring); Riviello v. Barbers Union,
88 Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P.2d 400 (1948) (picketing to compel employer to accept
second-class status in union).
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Over time, the conduct injunction assumed a standardized form
and most such injunctions contained two parts: a series of prohibitions
against certain otherwise unlawful acts and a set of restrictions on the
numbers or spacing of the union's pickets."9  The propriety of the
former part, prohibiting unlawful acts which have occurred and are
continuing, is clear. However, in light of the fact that peaceful picket-
ing for a lawful object is entitled to protection under the first amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 2 of the California
Constitution,"0 the latter part, restricting the number and spacing of
pickets is more questionable2' and deserves further discussion.
19. Aaron & Levin, supra note 3, at 55.
20. The California Constitution provides: "Every person may freely speak, write
and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this
right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 2.
21. The suggestion is made in a few federal cases that restrictions on numbers and
spacing do not implicate free speech rights because they simply constitute a prohibition
on picketing en masse, which is per se unlawful. In an opinion approving a numbers and
spacing injunction, the Supreme Court concluded: "It is idle to talk of peaceful
communication in such a place and under such conditions. The numbers of the pickets
in the groups constituted intimidation." American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central
Traders Council, 257 U.S. 184, 205 (1921). The Court later reemphasized its refusal to
extend the protection of the first amendment to picketing en masse. Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940). The same distinction between mere peaceful
picketing and picketing en masse appears as dicta in California cases. See, e.g., Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Council of Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d 893, 903-04, 553 P.2d 603, 611, 132
Cal. Rptr. 443, 451 (1976); Musicians Local 6 v. Superior Ct., 69 Cal. 2d 695, 710, 447
P.2d 313, 323, 73 Cal. Rptr. 201, 211 (1968); Pezold v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 54
Cal. App. 2d 120, 128 P.2d 611 (1942) (dictum); People v. Spear, 32 Cal. App. 2d 165,
168, 89 P.2d 445, 446-47 (1939); People v. Yuen, 32 Cal. App. 2d 151, 163, 89 P.2d 438,
444 (1939).
On the other hand, the language of the cases might be explained by the fact that the
courts were discussing the legality not of otherwise peaceful behavior, but rather of
picketing en masse as one aspect of a course of intimidating conduct. The few
California cases to consider picketing en masse apart from intimidation appear to have
found it to be lawful. See, e.g., McKay v. Auto. Salesmen's Local 1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311,
320, 106 P.2d 373, 378 (1940). "[I]f there are a number of employees who have left a
common employer, they are within their legal rights if and when they attempt as a group
to persuade other employees, who continue to work, to quit, provided there be no force,
violence, or intimidation, physical or moral, used-that is, the mere fact of numbers does
not necessarily make such persuasion illegal." Southern Cal. Iron & Steel Co. v. Iron
Workers Local 3, 186 Cal. 604, 612, 200 P. 1, 4 (1921), quoted in In re Lyons, 27 Cal.
App. 2d 293, 302, 81 P.2d 190, 195 (1938).
In addition, the California Supreme Court has recently made it clear that a numbers
and spacing injunction is different in kind from an injunction against "violence, intimida-
tion and obstruction." The court found that a numbers and spacing injunction enjoined
lawful, presumptively protected activity and that such an injunction therefore raised
constitutional questions. UFW v. Superior Ct., 16 Cal. 3d 499, 504-05, 546 P.2d 713,
716-17, 128 Cal. Rptr. 209, 212-13. The specific question of the legality of picketing en
masse was not, however, resolved.
In California, the fountainhead of the doctrine that past unlawful
conduct by pickets may justify regulation of future, otherwise lawful,
conduct through numbers and spacing restrictions is Steiner v. Oil
Workers Local 128.2 There, the evidence showed that, in the course of
organizational picketing, pickets had "shadowed" employees and their
wives, thrown rocks at the plant, grabbed one customer, threatened
several persons, blocked a driveway on one occasion, and used "vile,
abusive and insulting" language. A closely divided court, relying on the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Milk Wagon Drivers
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,2 3 held:
[T]he inherent power of a court of equity to grant injunctive relief
is not limited to the imposition of a restraint against the violent
and unlawful conduct, but may, under given conditions, be exer-
cised to enjoin future picketing in any form.... Accordingly, where
past picketing has become so irrevocably blended with acts of
violence, physical intimidation or other unlawful conduct as to
give rise to a justifiable belief that future picketing is likely to re-
sult in a continuance of the illegal acts, an injunction restraining
a labor organization from any and all picketing lies within the
equitable power of the Court and does not constitute an infringe-
ment of the right of free speech.24
The dissent strongly criticized the decision,25 as did the only commenta-
tor to consider it.26 The facts of the case were clearly distinguishable
from Meadowmoor, where the evidence had shown a plague of violence
(fifty windows were smashed, seven bombs thrown, five trucks damaged
and numerous people beaten") and the object of the picketing was in any
event illegal under Illinois law.28 Furthermore, even if such a rule were
permissible under the U.S. Constitution, the court need not have adopt-
ed such a rule for California. Nevertheless, Steiner has not been
questioned by the court and in fact has been repeatedly cited.29
22. 19 Cal. 2d 676, 123 P.2d 20 (1942).
23. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
24. 19 Cal. 2d at 682-83, 123 P.2d at 24-25.
25. Justice Carter, joined by Chief Justice Gibson and Justice Traynor, declared:
"I can think of no logical reason, and none is advanced by the majority opinion as to
why the courts cannot enjoin tortious conduct without sacrificing the constitutionality
[sic] guaranteed civil liberties in the process. I see no valid reason why the courts
cannot exercise adequate and efficient control over picketing by limiting its coercive
process to tortious conduct. It is not acting alone in its effort in that respect. The
entire machinery of the criminal law is available and ready, able and willing to thwart
and punish acts of violence." Id. at 704, 123 P.2d at 35.
26. 30 CALiF. L. Rnv. 572 (1942).
27. Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,
291-92 (1941).
28. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753, 371 Il1. 377, 21
N.E.2d 308 (1939).
29. The court most recently cited Steiner in two cases discussed below: UFW v.
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The Steiner court allowed an injunction barring peaceful picketing
only where "past picketing has become. . . irrevocably blended with
acts of violence, physical intimidation or other unlawful conduct." How-
ever, the doctrine developed in the lower courts that a lesser showing of
harm by the person picketed would justify limitations of a less drastic
nature on peaceful picketing, and trial courts began routinely to issue
injunctions containing numbers and spacing restrictions.30
Despite the disappearance of the object injunction and the substitu-
tion of facially "reasonable" numbers and spacing restrictions for a total
ban on picketing in conduct injunctions, such injunctions are still fre-
quently sought and continue to play a powerful role in labor disputes in
a number of ways. First, the granting of any injunction is seen by the
parties and -the public as a vindication and legitimation of one side's
position in the underlying dispute, and it inevitably weakens the union's
strike or boycott efforts. Second, even those portions of an injunction
which do no more than forbid the commission of certain unlawful acts
seriously threaten the union in two respects. They subject union mem-
bers to prosecution by the other party to the dispute before the same
judge who issued the injunction, without the benefits of safeguards they
would have if prosecuted criminally for the same acts, such as trial by
jury.3 ' They also make the union punishable for the acts of its mem-
bers. Finally, the imposition of numbers and spacing limitations may
critically hamper the union's efforts. The persuasiveness of a union's
message comes not alone from its abstract verbal content. Other work-
ers and the public may be persuaded that -the absence of a substantial
number of pickets means that the union is weak and will lose. The
union's ability to communicate its messages may be substantially re-
duced because the pickets cannot spend sufficient time conversing with
all who approach the line or because some will not be present who, due
to a relationship or acquaintance with another worker or member of the
public, might be more effective in setting forth the union's views. Also,
pickets are sometimes subjected to physical or psychological intimida-
tion by the party picketed, and their ability to withstand such pressure is
diminished when their numbers are limited.
With these general considerations in mind, we turn to an examina-
Superior Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 902, 912 n.9, 537 P.2d 1237, 1243, 122 Cal. Rptr. 877, 883
(1975) (William Buak Fruit Co.) and UFW v. Superior Ct., 16 Cal. 3d 499, 505-06, 546
P.2d 713, 717, 128 Cal. Rptr. 209, 213 (1976) (California Retail Liquor Dealers
Institute).
30. Aaron & Levin, supra note 3, at 55.
31. See text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
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tion of the picketing injunction in the specific context of farm labor
disputes.
The Trial Courts and Picketing Injunctions
The procedures for obtaining injunctive relief in California are set
out in sections 525 to 535 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Although
section 527.3 now sets forth certain limitations applicable only to labor
dispute injunctions, during the period covered by this study, the same
procedures governed labor dispute and all other injunction cases. In
brief, they are as follows. The plaintiff, upon filing a complaint, may
obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO), if it can prove that it is
threatened with great and irreparable injury during the pendency of the
action. The TRO may be obtained ex parte and may be granted on the
basis of affidavits or on the basis of a verified complaint alone." If
granted, the TRO is valid for up to fifteen days (or twenty days for good
cause).3 3 Whether or not a TRO is granted, the plaintiff obtains and
serves an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not
be issued. At the hearing on the order to show cause, the defendant is
entitled to present evidence, but, again, the preliminary injunction may
be granted on the basis of a verified complaint or -affidavits.34 On
granting a TRO, the court may,35 and on granting a preliminary injunc-
tion, the court must,"6 require that the plaintiff post an undertaking to
indemnify the defendant for damages occasioned by the granting of the
TRO or preliminary injunction if the final decision is that the plaintiff is
not entitled to relief.17 The case is then entitled to precedence and must
be tried at the earliest possible date.38
"'The Granting or Denial of a Preliminary Injunction Does Not Amount
to an Adjudication of the Ultimate Rights in Controversy.' . . . The
General Purpose of Such an Injunction Is the Preservation of the Status
Quo Until a Final Determination of the Merits of the Action. '3 9
32. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 527 (West Supp. 1976).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Biasca v. Superior Ct., 194 Cal. 366, 288 P. 861 (1924); Dickey v. Rosso,
23 Cal. App. 3d 493, 496, 100 Cal. Rptr. 358, 360 (1972).
36. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 529 (West 1954).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 527 (West Supp. 1976).
39. Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 68 Cal. 2d 512, 528, 439 P.2d 889, 899, 67
Cal. Rptr. 761, 771 (1968), quoting Miller & Lux v. Madiera Canal Co., 155 Cal. 59,
62-63, 99 P. 502, 511 (1909).
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In theory, the summary procedures involved in the granting of
TROs and preliminary injunctions are justified by their limited purpose
and short duration-they exist solely to preserve the status quo until a
full trial may be had. For this reason, the court, in considering applica-
tions for such orders, should not make a determination as to the ultimate
rights of the parties but instead should determine only whether the
plaintiff has a reasonable probability of success on the merits and
whether the plaintiff will suffer a greater injury by the denial of the
injunction than the defendant will suffer by its granting.40 In making a
determination on such imprecise standards, the court is accorded wide
discretion. 1
As numerous authorities have observed, however, whatever the
validity of this rationale in other types of cases, the procedures do not
work in the labor dispute context.4" A TRO or preliminary injunction
cannot preserve the status quo in a labor dispute. Once the momentum
of a strike or boycott is broken by a restrictive injunction, a trial years
later is of little significance. This is particularly true in the farm labor
context where the critical period for effective pressure against an em-
ployer may be a harvest season lasting less than a month, Thus,
intervention by a court may not merely delay the exercise of rights by
the union but may defeat a union campaign altogether. 43 Thereafter,
the plaintiff has no interest in obtaining a trial on the merits, and the
TRO or preliminary injunction becomes the final order in the case.
Previous empirical studies in nonfarm labor disputes have demon-
strated that few labor injunction cases go to trial. Witte, in his study of
injunction cases in New York City during -the period between 1910 and
1927, found that only 7 of the 45 cases (16 percent) where a TRO or
preliminary injunction had been obtained went to trial.44 In Aaron and
Levin's Los Angeles County study for the period between 1946 and
1950, it was found that only 4 of 120 cases (3 percent) went to trial.4 5
40. Id.
41. Harbor Chevrolet Corp. v. Machinists Local 1484, 173 Cal. App. 2d 380, 343
P.2d 640 (1959).
42. See FRANKFRTER & GREENE, supra note 2, at 89-105; WrrrE, supra note 3, at
89, 93; Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts-Part II: A Critique, 50 VA. L.
REv. 1147, 1158-62 (1964); Aaron & Levin, supra note 3, at 65.
43. "It has been demonstrated that the granting of temporary injunctions in labor
disputes usually has the effect of determining and terminating the entire controversy."
McKay v. Retail Auto. Salesmen's Local 1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 330, 106 P.2d 373, 383
(1940).
44. WrrrF, supra note 3, at 90 n.1, 93 & n.1.
45. Aaron & Levin, supra note 3, at 53.
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The present study of California farm labor injunctions between 1965
and 1975 comes to the same conclusion. Temporary restraining orders
were granted in 171 of the 173 cases where one was requested; pre-
liminary injunctions were granted in 138 of the 141 cases which went to
a hearing on an order to show cause; no case went to trial. 6 In all but
a few cases, the plaintiff, having obtained the TRO or preliminary in-
junction, made no further attempt to pursue the case. A total of 45
cases was dismissed, all but 2 voluntarily or by stipulation.17  In 13 of
those cases, the dismissals occurred after the UFW, by demurrer or
interrogatories, pursued the case beyond the granting of a preliminary
injunction. Why didn't plaintiffs pursue cases beyond the preliminary
injunction stage? Two reasons are suggested. Either the plaintiffs had
already obtained in the preliminary injunctions all or more than they
could have hoped to obtain after trial, or the underlying controversy
was terminated or substantially altered during the pendency of the action.
Because farm labor injunction cases did not go to trial, the process
by which temporary injunctions were obtained assumed an importance
far beyond that conceived of by the relevant statutes.
"To Issue an Injunction Is the Exercise of a Delicate Power, Requiring
Great Caution and Sound Discretion, and Rarely, if Ever Should [It]
Be Exercised in a Doubtful Case.148
The fact that in 175 injunction cases over a ten-year period only
two TRO requests and three preliminary injunction applications were
denied49 strongly suggests that the courts did not always act with "great
caution" in granting relief. The present study indicates that courts
46. In one case only was a permanent injunction obtained against the UFW, and
that by default when the UFW failed to file an answer to the complaint. Buttes Gas &
Oil Co. v. UFW, No. 428807 (Alameda County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 13, 1972).
47. In one case, still pending, where a preliminary injunction was obtained by 102
individual plaintiffs and a class of approximately 2,000 store owners represented by the
California Retail Liquor Dealers Institute (CRLDI), 28 individual plaintiffs were
dismissed as a result of demurrers or failure to answer interrogatories and CRLDI
dismissed the class action in an attempt to prevent the California Supreme Court from
hearing the case. California Retail Liquor Dealers Inst. v. UFW, No. 70708 (Monterey,
Cal. Super. Ct., Feb. 26, 1974).
48. Willis v. Lauridson, 161 Cal. 106, 117, 118 P. 530, 535 (1911), cited in
Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green, 41 Cal. App. 3d 146, 148, 115 Cal. Rptr. 879, 880
(1974); West v. Lind, 186 Cal. App. 2d 563, 569, 9 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1960).
49. In a few cases where TROs or preliminary injunctions were ultimately granted,
relief had initially been denied, usually on the ground of lack of notice or lack of service.
See, e.g., Franzia Bro's Winery v. UFW, No. 113822 (San Joaquin County, Cal. Super.
Ct., filed July 27, 1973); Fischer Foods, Inc. v. UFW, No. 45706 (Imperial County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Feb. 24, 1975).
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frequently granted TROs or preliminary injunctions irrespective of the
substance and credibility of the proof put before them.
The Quality of the Plaintiff's Evidence
Although the evidence in support of a TRO or preliminary injunc-
tion may be produced by way of a verified complaint or affidavits, the
evidence must still meet the standards of admissibility applied to oral
testimony." In order to obtain interim relief, the plaintiff must present
"a detailed showing of specific facts justifying such relief."51  Further-
more, the evidence must show that the unlawful acts alleged are still
occurring or are being threatened at the time relief is sought.52
In fact, TROs and preliminary injunctions are often granted on the
barest of showings. In 78 of the 171 cases in which TROs were granted
(46 percent), the evidence in support consisted of one declaration (or
one declaration or less per plaintiff in cases involving multiple plain-
tiffs) or a verified complaint alone. The same was true in 35 of the 138
cases where a preliminary injunction was granted. In 15 of these cases,
the TRO was obtained on the basis of the conclusory allegations of the
complaint alone. A striking example of the ease with which a TRO can
be obtained comes from a series of 3 cases filed within a short time
in San Joaquin County.53 In each of the 3 cases, a TRO was obtained
on the basis of a verified complaint alone, and with the exception of
the front page identifying the plaintiff and its property, the complaints
were identical. 4
Even where declarations were used, however, there was often no
"detailed showing" justifying relief. The following examples reveal
how little was needed to obtain an order. In a boycott case, the total
evidence relating to alleged unlawful activity which supported a stand-
50. E.H. Renzel Co. v. Warehousemen's Union, 16 Cal. 2d 369, 106 P.2d 1
(1940).
51. McKay v. Retail Auto. Salesmen's Local 1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 320, 106 P.2d
373, 378 (1940).
52. Where the unlawful acts have been completed or have ceased, an injunction is
improper. See Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 P. 1027 (1908);
Crescent Feather Co. v. Upholsterers Local 28, 153 Cal. 433, 95 P. 871 (1908).
53. Norman v. UFW, No. 114453 (San Joaquin County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Sept. 20, 1973); Piazza v. UFW, No. 114411 (San Joaquin County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Sept. 18, 1973); Herbert Buck Ranches v. UFW, No. 114342 (San Joaquin County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Sept. 12, 1973).
54. In two additional cases, where a TRO was not requested, the verified com-
plaint was also identical. Miller v. UFW, No. 114533 (San Joaquin County, Cal. Super.
Ct., filed Sept. 27, 1973); Westing v. UFW, No. 114532 (San Joaquin County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Sept. 27, 1973).
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ard TRO consisted of the following statements from two declarations:
The density of the line and the number of the pickets made it
difficult for part of the time for customers to enter through the
doors while the pickets were picketing.
The density of the pickets and the number of pickets made it
difficult for customers to enter the store.
55
The statements, of course, consist entirely of opinion with no supporting
facts, and they reveal no unlawful conduct.
In a case involving field picketing, a TRO prohibiting blocking,
obstructing, harassing, threatening, and violence and applying strict num-
bers and spacing limitations was obtained on the basis of this declara-
tion:
On that date I was a passenger in a car being driven by Jack
Atwood, who is the celery harvesting superintendent for Freshpict
Foods, Inc. As we approached the Davis Ranch, located on Fos-
ter Road, I observed a group of 40 to 50 UFWOC pickets, some
of whom were carrying UFWOC banners and signs along the
shoulder of Foster Road by the entrance to the ranch property.
As we approached, several of these pickets commenced shouting
insults and obscenities. When we slowed almost to a stop to
make the turn onto the ranch road, one of these pickets rushed to
the side of the car, peered into Mr. Atwood's closed window,
closed his fist, extended his middle finger, said "Fuck you."
When we left the field about 30 minutes later we were again
the target of derisive verbage [sic]. One picket grabbed the mic-
rophone to the public address system that was mounted on the
roof of one of the cars and announced "what you been doing Jack?
You big prick." The volume of the public address system was
turned up high enough for these words to have carried for quite
some distance.5 6
While the declaration might support an injunction against using
obscenities, there is no evidence of any other enjoinable activity by the
pickets.
Finally, in a labor camp picketing case, the only declaration in
support of a TRO contained the following substantive information:
There were 52 pickets at the camp yelling and screaming.
Many were carrying red UFW strike flags. The picketers had a
loud speaker attached to the top of a car and spotlights turned into
the camp.
55. Thriftimart, Inc. v. UFW, No. 130804 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct, Sept.
27, 1974). The order granting the preliminary injunction was reversed by the court of
appeal. Thriftimart, Inc. v. UFW, No. 2540 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist., filed Apr. 13,
1976).
56. Freshpict Foods, Inc. v. UFW, No. 68164 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. CL,
filed Oct. 2, 1970).
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The pickets kept yelling and are still doing so at 11:00 a.m.
I have heard employees in the camp say they are afraid to go out
to work since they didn't want to go through the group of fifty
pickets. 57
Not only is the declaration largely inadmissable hearsay, but also noth-
ing in the declaration indicates the pickets engaged in other than consti-
tutionally protected speech.58
Even where the plaintiff's evidence made out a prima facie case that
unlawful picketing occurred, in several cases the evidence failed to
demonstrate that the unlawful activity was ongoing and therefore
presented a threat of future harm. In one case, the proof conclusively
showed that the strike in question had ended seventy days oefore the
preliminary injunction was granted.59 In another instance, a TRO was
issued on the basis of a picketing incident which was forty-five days
old.6 0 In short, a scanty showing of a present threat of unlawful
conduct in a number of cases proved no bar to obtaining a TRO or
preliminary injunction.
The Credibility of the Evidence
The substance of the evidence is not the only factor to be weighed
in determining whether the plaintiff has made out a sufficient case for
extraordinary relief; its credibility must also be assessed.
The California Supreme Court has declared:
The possible bias of parties signing verified complaints and
affidavits in labor dispute cases and the pro forma nature of their
factual allegations have long been recognized by commentators as
a source of procedural difficulty. 1
57. Pacific Farms, Inc. v. Chavez, No. 129220 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed July 3, 1974).
58. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 546-50, (1965); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235-38 (1963); In re Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 612, 618-21, 510 P.2d
1017, 1020-22, 108 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468-70 (1973).
59. Jackson Farming Co. v. Chavez, No. 44626 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Feb. 20, 1974).
60. Richard Peters Farms v. UFW, No. 16937 (Riverside County, Cal. Super. CL,
filed Apr. 16, 1973).
61. UFW v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 902, 908 n.4, 537 P.2d 1237, 1241, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 877, 881 (1975), citing FRANKFuRTER & GREENE, supra note 2, at 34-35, 65, 201,
and Aaron & Levin, supra note 3, at 48-49. "The experience both upon the hearings as
to whether a preliminary injunction should issue, and upon the contempt proceedings,
have convinced me that affidavits are an untrustworthy guide for judicial action. That is
the case in all legal proceedings, but it is peculiarly true of litigation growing out of a
strike, where feelings on both sides are necessarily wrought up, and the desire for victory
is likely to obscure nice moral questions and poison the minds of men by prejudice....
Experience, as I have stated, has caused me to be so incredulous of affidavits that I have
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Despite the severe doubts of the California Supreme Court and com-
mentators, the vast majority of TROs and preliminary injunctions stu-
died were based solely on evidence from interested parties. In 150 of
the 171 cases where a TRO issued (88 percent), the plaintiff's case
consisted entirely of evidence from the plaintiff or persons aligned with
the plaintiff. Evidence from neutral observers was hardly more fre-
quent in support of preliminary injunctions; in 111 of the 138 cases
studied (80 percent), the plaintiff also failed to produce evidence from
a neutral person.
The criticism by the courts and commentators of reliance on affida-
vits as a means of factfinding has been similarly unheeded. In part, this
is not the fault of the courts, because Code of Civil Procedure section
527 provides that a TRO or preliminary injunction may be granted
upon a verified complaint or affidavits. On the other hand, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, in a nonlabor dispute case, has gone a step further
and held that not only is the plaintiff not required to call witnesses to
prove its case but the court also has the discretion to bar the defendant
from calling witnesses where "necessary to conserve the time of the
department handling these matters." '62 In only 3 of the 171 TROs and
20 of the 138 preliminary injunctions did the court hear live testimony.63
The danger of proceeding solely on affidavits was pointed out in one
court of appeal case, where a preliminary injunction was reversed on
other grounds:
In this case there were cogent reasons why the court's dis-
cretion should have been exercised in favor of permitting in-court
examination of witnesses. The cause dealt with the exercise of
that great power, the injunction, to effectively curtail activity which
in part at least is entitled to constitutional protection under the
First Amendment. Depriving a party of the right to exercise that
greatest of all instruments of truth determination-the right of
cross-examination-is not to be regarded lightly in such a circum-
stance. This is especially true in view of the pragmatic fact that
resolution of the issue at the preliminary injunction stage often
effectively results in the final disposition of the dispute, and in view
required in all important matters the presence of the chief witnesses upon each side at
the hearing." Pezold v. Amalgamated Workmen, 54 Cal. App. 2d 120, 129, 128 P.2d
611, 616-17 (1942), citing Great Northern Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414, 416 (D.N.D.
1923).
62. Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 68 Cal. 2d 512, 524-25 n.7, 439 P.2d 889,
897, 67 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769 (1968).
63. The findings are consistent with those of Aaron and Levin, who found that
live witnesses appeared in only one of the 151 hearings studied. Aaron & Levin, supra
note 3, at 51.
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of the recognition that affidavits are an untrustworthy guide forjudicial action, particularly in litigation growing out of a strike.64
Despite this language the court reaffirmed the principle that the matter
was generally one for the trial court's discretion.
Evidence from the Defendant
Even a substantial showing of credible evidence by a plaintiff
should be insufficient to warrant an injunction if the defendant presents
contrary evidence. At the preliminary injunction stage, the trial court
should not and cannot, on the basis of a written record alone, make
factual determinations. Nevertheless, in all but a handful of cases, at
least by the time of the hearing on the order to show cause, the UFW
had filed the declarations rebutting in whole or in part the plaintiff's
allegations or raising affirmative defenses (e.g., "clean hands"), and in
all but three cases, the issues were still considered sufficiently free from
doubt that the preliminary injunction issued.
In a number of the cases, the quantity of opposition evidence
produced by the UFW was substantial."5 In some cases, the UFW filed
over 100 declarations opposing the preliminary injunction." In one of
the cases, the UFW filed 157 declarations in opposition to 47 from the
plaintiff. 7 In another case, the 100 or so declarations from the UFW
were opposed by 2 from the plaintiff.6 In a number of other cases, the
UFW submitted more evidence than the plaintiff. In one case, the
UFW filed 27 declarations and nine photographs in opposition to 10
declarations from the plaintiff."' Yet in all these cases preliminary
injunctions issued.
64. Thriftimart, Inc. v. UFW, No. 2540, at 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist., Apr. 13,
1976) (citation omitted).
65. Given the difficulty of evaluating by objective standards the substance and
quality of the UFW's evidence, no attempt to do so is made here. However, the quantity
of opposition evidence in some cases suggests at least that the plaintiffs' contentions were
open to question.
66. See, e.g., Eugene Nalbandian, Inc. v. UFW, No. 124128 (Kern County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed July 13, 1973); Kovacevich v. UFW, No. 122967 (Kern County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Apr. 25, 1973); Coachella-Imperial Distrib., Inc. v. UFW, No. 16939
(Riverside County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 17, 1973).
67. Eugene Nalbandian, Inc. v. UFW, No. 124128 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed July 13, 1973).
68. Coachella-Imperial Distrib., Inc. v. UFW, No. 16939 (Riverside County, Cal.
Super Ct., filed Apr. 17, 1973).
69. Kirkorian v. UFW, No. 123371 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed May 25,
1973).
The case of California Retail Liquor Dealers Institute v. UFW70
illustrates the confluence of all these factors. 7 ' The suit sought a
sweeping injunction against the UFW on behalf of more than 100
individual plaintiffs, the 2,000 members of the California Retail Liquor
Dealers Institute (CRLDI), and all 10,000 holders of retail liquor
licenses in the state. The plaintiffs filed over 100 declarations, but
there was no proof at all from some individual plaintiffs nor from class
members who were not individual plaintiffs. The declarations were of
mixed quality. Although some alleged substantial misconduct on the
part of the UFW, others stated that picketing was peaceful or that no
picketing had yet occurred. The declarations described no violence
except four instances of property damage, none of them attributed to the
UFW, and one technical battery.
The plaintiffs produced no live witnesses and only four "neutral"
declarations (two friends of a plaintiff and two other store owners). The
UFW, for its part filed close to 150 declarations rebutting the plaintiffs'
allegations and included 30 declarations from neutral private persons
(police officers, customers, and passersby). Despite the limited quality
of the plaintiffs' proof, their failure to prove any acts of violence, the
numerous factual conflicts in the declarations, and the support for the
UFW's contentions in the neutral declarations, the trial court found that
a pattern of violence by the UFW had been proved and issued an
injunction on behalf of the 102 individual plaintiffs and the 2,000
members of CRLDI.
"It Is a Familiar Doctrine of Equity that the Scope of the Injunction
Will Be Limited to the Wrongful Act Sought To Be Prevented." 72
The doctrine that an injunction should be no broader than the
wrongful acts committed and sought to be enjoined assumes constitution-
al dimensions when applied to picketing cases.
When enjoining activities in the sensitive area of First Amend-
ment freedoms, courts must draft temporary restraining orders
"couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-
pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the
essential needs of the public order. '73
70. No. 70708 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct., Feb. 26, 1974).
71. See text accompanying notes 140-49 infra.
72. Magill Bros. v. Building Serv. Employees Union, 20 Cal. 2d 506, 512, 127 P.2d
542, 545 (1942).
73. UFW v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 902, 909, 537 P.2d 1237, 1242, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 877, 882 (1975), quoting Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol 28
March 1977] PICKETING INIUNCTIONS IN CALIFORNIA 817
For that reason, the trial courts should devote even greater than usual
care to the drafting of such orders.
The Terms of the Injunction
No matter what the plaintiffs' proof, the injunctions studied con-
tained a fairly standard set of prohibitions against unlawful activities. A
total of 163 out of the 171 TROs (95 percent) and 132 of the 138
preliminary injunctions (97 percent) contained prohibitions against
blocking, obstructing, trespassing, and so forth. A total of 151 of the
171 TROs (88 percent) and 122 of the 138 preliminary injunctions
(88 percent) contained prohibitions against conduct such as threatening
or harassing. A lesser number of TROs and preliminary injunctions
dealt with violence and property damage. A total of 125 of the 171
TROs (71 percent) and 106 of the 138 preliminary injunctions (77
percent) prohibited violence, personal injury, and property damage. It
was not fruitful to measure -the correlation of the proof and the injunc-
tion term in the first two categories, because the proof in nearly every
one of the cases consisted of general pro forma declarations with no
references to specific episodes. But as to the third category, in 67 of
the 125 cases (54 percent) where there was a TRO against violence and
in 44 of 106 cases (42 percent) where there was a preliminary injunc-
tion against violence, the plaintiff offered no proof, direct or circum-
stantial, that the UFW had caused any personal injury, caused any
property damage, or committed even a technical battery.74
The variations in the terms of the injunctions granted were more
closely' related to the county of suit than to proof in the individual
case.75  At any given time, in each county, a fairly standard injunc-
tion was granted against the UFW regardless of the plaintiff's prooL 76
For example, in 1973 the standard injunction in Kern County was
74. In arriving at this conclusion, allegations of such incidents of violence have
been disregarded where the only proof of the allegation consisted of inadmissible
evidence or where the inference of the UFW's involvement in the alleged incident was
supported by nothing more than the coincidence of concerted economic activity against
the plaintiff during the same time period.
75. When differences in injunctions within a county did appear, they seemed to
derive from the fact that plaintiffs were represented by different attorneys rather than
from differences in proof.
76. In many cases, this standardization resulted from the trial court's earlier
determination to consolidate several cases for hearing, itself a questionable practice.
See, e.g., Coachella-Imperial Distribs., Inc. v. UFW, No. 16939 (Riverside County,
Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 17, 1973) (one of six consolidated cases); Pandol v. UFW,
No. 124576 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct, filed Aug. 9, 1973) (one of four consolidated
cases).
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granted in twelve cases, involving some situations in which the plaintiff
submitted numerous declarations alleging a pattern of violent and un-
lawful activity7 and others where the plaintiff's evidence consisted of
one or two declarations revealing basically nonviolent, innocuous activi-
ty.78 The Kern County form injunction generally prohibited blocking,
obstructing, trespassing, threatening, harassing, injuring persons or
property, and using foul or obscene language; it limited the UFW to
four pickets per entrance plus one picket at every one hundred feet along
the perimeter of the plaintiff's property. In Riverside County in 1973,
the standard injunction contained the same general prohibitions on
unlawful activities as the Kern County injunction, but very different
numbers and spacing limitations (four pickets per entrance and no other
picketing within sixty feet of the plaintiff's property). This form
injunction was issued in sixteen cases, some of which contained a sub-
stantial showing of repeated unlawful activities79 while in others the
total proof consisted of a single conclusory declaration alleging no
significant unlawful acts. 80  In Ventura County in 1974, the standard
injunction (issued in four cases) differed substantially from those in the
other counties." In the unlawful acts portion, it prohibited only injury
to persons or property, while the numbers and spacing provisions limit-
ed the UFW to four pickets per entrance plus two pickets every fifty feet
up to a maximum of fifty pickets.8 2
The fact that the type of injunction obtained might depend on the
county of suit was not lost on plaintiffs, and may have invited significant
forum shopping, since the UFW, as an incorporated association, was
suable in any county where a member could be found. 3  The various
cases involving Safeway Stores, Inc., are illustrative of the extremes of
77. See, e.g., Eugene Nalbandian, Inc. v. UFW, No. 124128 (Kern County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed July 13, 1973).
78. See, e.g., Delcor Corp. v. UFW, No. 124436 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Aug. 2, 1973); William Mosesian Corp. v. UFW, No. 123443 (Kern County. Cal.
Super. Ct., filed June 4, 1973).
79. See, e.g., Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. UFW, No. 16940 (Riverside
County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 17, 1973).
80. See, e.g., Bobara Ranch v. UFW, No. 16989 (Riverside County, Cal. Super.
Ct., filed Apr. 30, 1973).
81. See, e.g., Frank McGrath Ranch Co. v. Chavez, No. 57087 (Ventura County,
Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 6, 1974).
82. Not only the terms of the injunction, but the amount of the bond varied by
county. In Kern County the bonds were set at $2,000, in Riverside County at $1,000.
and in Ventura County at $5,000 on the granting of the preliminary injunctions. See
cases cited notes 77-81.
83. CAL. CODE CIV. PROc. §§ 395, 395.2 (West 1973).
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this problem. In October 1968, Safeway (along with numerous other
stores) obtained an injunction in Los Angeles County limiting the UFW
to four pickets per entrance at its stores in that county. 4 In September
1970, Safeway (along with other stores), alleging that a new consumer
boycott had begun, filed suit in Kern County. 5 There, Safeway ob-
tained a statewide injunction limiting the UFW to two pickets per
entrance plus four pickets in the parking lots at its stores. In February
1973, after the Kern County action had been dismissed with prejudice,
Safeway again filed suit in Los Angeles County.8 6 When this action ran
into difficulty, however, Safeway made an attempt to reopen by motion
its dismissed action in Kern County. This attempt failed, but Safeway
ultimately obtained an even more restrictive preliminary injunction in
the Los Angeles case, limiting the UFW to one picket per entrance and
a maximum of seven pickets at any store in the state.
The Scope of the Injunction
In addition to imposing limitations on the defendant's activity of a
kind not justified by the evidence, an injunction may violate equitable
and constitutional strictures against overbreadth if it applies to a location
where no unlawful activity has been threatened. In the UFW cases
studied, this issue arose in three distinct but related contexts.
The cases revealed nine instances in which relief was granted to a
class in a suit brought by a representative plaintiff. In five cases,87 suit
was brought by a produce shipping company on behalf of itself and all
the growers shipping through the company. In four cases, 88 a trade
association which alleged that some of its members had been injured by
unlawful picketing obtained an injunction on behalf of its member-
84. Food Giant Markets, Inc. v. UFW, No. 941805 (Los Angeles County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Oct. 24, 1968).
85. 'Lucky Stores, Inc. v. UFW, No. 111389 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Sept. 25, 1970).
86. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. UFW, No. 49627 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Super.
Ct., filed Feb. 9, 1973).
87. ITO Packing Co. v. UFW, No. 160071 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
July 28, 1973); Ballantine Produce Co., Inc. v. UFW, No. 159927 (Fresno County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed July 18, 1973); Barr Packing Co. v. UFW, No. 159886 (Fresno County,
Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 16, 1973); Ballantine Produce Co., Inc. v. UFW, No. 383764
(Alameda County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 10, 1968); Ballantine Produce Co., Inc. v.
UFW, No. 596167 (San Francisco County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 2, 1968).
88. Nor-Cal Growers Ass'n v. UFW, No. 31598 (Yolo County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Sept. 10, 1974); Northern Cal. Grocers Ass'n v. UFW, No. 130413 (Kern County,
Cal. Super. Ct., filed Sept. 6, 1974); California Retail Liquor Dealers Inst. v. UFW, No.
70708 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 24, 1974); Desert Grape Growers
League v. UFW, No. 11571 (Riverside County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 2, 1968).
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ship.8 9 The class action device permitted the plaintiffs to seek broad
relief on the basis of selected evidence from a limited number of class
members. Such injunctions ought to have raised significant first
amendment questions since they prohibited conduct at locations where
no conduct, lawful or otherwise, had yet occurred9" and since they
granted relief -that could hardly have been tailored narrowly to the exact
needs of the absent plaintiffs.9
The use of the class action device created two significant practical
burdens on the UFW not present in the average case. First, the burden
of proof as to the lawfulness vel non of the picketing activities at
properties of class members not producing evidence was, in effect,
shifted to the UFW. At -the same time, those class members not named
as plaintiffs were shielded from the normal discovery procedures which
would have been available if individual suits had been brought.92 The
future of such class actions is discussed below. 93
The second type of case raising similar problems involved a num-
ber of plaintiffs who jointly brought suit and obtained an injunction on
the basis of evidence produced by only some of them. This study found
fifteen multiple plaintiff cases where one or more named plaintiffs, who
produced no proof of picketing at their properties, obtained temporary
injunctions. 94  These plaintiffs were no more entitled to relief than the
absent class members discussed above since they produced no evidence
from which a court could have concluded that unlawful activity was
imminent or from which a court could have tailored appropriate relief.
The only difference, in fact, was that -these plaintiffs took on all the
discovery obligations of actual parties.
89. Aside from first amendment and class action problems which are discussed
subsequently, the suits by trade associations raise standing problems as well, since the
associations alleged no injury to themselves. Cf. Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal. 2d 344, 353,
254 P.2d 6, 10 (1953). Also, the trade associations could not, in an action against a
private entity, rely on the "private attorney general" theory. Cf. Residents of Beverly
Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. App. 3d 117, 122, 109 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727
(1973).
90. See, e.g., Pezold v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 54 Cal. App. 2d 120, 126, 128
P.2d 611, 615 (1942).
91. See, e.g., UFW v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 902, 909, 537 P.2d 1237, 1241-42,
122 Cal. Rptr. 877, 881-82 (1975).
92. Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 832, 500 P.2d 621, 103
Cal. Rptr. 709 (1972).
93. See text accompanying notes 134-44 infra.
94. See, e.g., Food Giant Mkts., Inc. v. UFW, No. 941805 (Los Angeles County,
Cal. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 24, 1968); George Bros., Inc. v. UFW, No. 71649 (Tulare
County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 22, 1971).
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The third related situation occurred where a plaintiff who had been
picketed at one or a few of its properties obtained an injunction covering
all of its properties, which may have been numerous and may have been
located hundreds of miles from the situs of the picketing. The study
revealed cases where growers, producing proof of picketing at one or
two locations, obtained TROs or preliminary injunctions covering as
many as seventy-eight properties.95 The situation on boycott injunc-
tions was even more extreme. One market chain obtained an injunction
covering sixty-two stores on proof that one was picketed.9" Another
obtained an injunction covering forty-three stores on proof that one
store had been picketed and another had been threatened with picket-
ing.9" The propriety of an injunction in-this type of case presents a more
difficult question than in the previous two types for two reasons. First,
unlike the other two situations, the plaintiff seeking an injunction cover-
ing all its property can prove that there exists a real threat of unlawful
conduct at as yet unpicketed locations by evidence that the acknowl-
edged labor dispute with the union covers those locations. Second,
unlike the other situations, the plaintiff can offer evidence as to the
physical circumstances of those locations so that the court may tailor its
relief. However, despite these theoretical differences, plaintiffs in the
present study did not present any such additional proof, and injunctions
were granted nonetheless.
"The Purpose of the Bond Is To Protect the Defendant in the Event that
a Final Judgment Against the Plaintiff Determines that the Restraint
Was Wrongly Imposed."9 8
Code of Civil Procedure section 529 provides that the party obtain-
ing a preliminary injunction must post an undertaking guaranteeing -that
the party or its surety
will pay to the party enjoined such damages, not exceeding an
amount to be specified, as such party may sustain by reason of the
injunction, if the court finally decides that the applicant was not
entitled thereto.99
95. See, e.g., Abatti Farms, Inc. v. Chavez, No. 41904 (Imperial County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Jan. 22, 1971).
96. Thriftimart, Inc. v. UFW, No. 2540 (Cal. CL App. 5th Dist. filed Apr. 13,
1976) (preliminary injunction reversed for overbreadth).
97. Fisher Foods, Inc. v. UFW, No. 45706 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. CL, filed
Feb. 24, 1975).
98. 2 B. Wrrn, CALiFoRNLA PRocnunrE 1.529 (2d ed. 1970).
99. CAL. CoDE Civ. Paoc. § 529 (West 1954). Despite some confusion and
suggestions to the contrary, there is no bond requirement for the granting of a TRO.
But see, e.g., KNEOir, CA.UFoNi& Sur ANy 4 Fm'E BoND PRAICE 39 (Supp.
1975).
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Final determination (final judgment or dismissal) that the plaintiff is not
entitled -to a permanent injunction constitutes ipso facto a determination
that the preliminary injunction was wrongfully issued. 100 Upon such a
final determination, the defendant is entitled to recover damages caused
by the injunction-but only up to the amount of the undertaking.'
The existence of the undertaking requirement is a factor possibly
justifying the issuance of an injunction in a doubtful case, since the
defendant erroneously enjoined will be compensated for any harm suf-
fered thereby. Yet this study discloses that the undertakings were so
minimal and so arbitrarily set as to be of little significance. Of the 132
bonds ordered posted on the granting of preliminary injunctions, 79 (61
percent) were $1,000 or less, and none was over $5,000. The amounts
bore no relationship to the number of plaintiffs suing in a given case-
in six of the nine class actions, including California Retail Liquor
Dealers Institute v. UFW, the undertaking was only $1,000. And the
amounts bore no relationship to the number of properties covered-the
largest chain store in the state obtained an injunction covering more
than five hundred stores and posted a bond of $500.12 Such amounts
could not have covered the UFW's attorneys' fees and costs, had any of
the cases actually been litigated to -trial. Additionally, the courts appear
not to have attributed any value to the UFW's economic and free speech
interests injured by an improper injunction. 10 3
California Retail Liquor Dealers again provides an extreme exam-
ple of this problem. There the undertaking of $1,000 amounted to
about forty cents for each of the 2,500 locations covered by the class
injunction. Within a short time after the preliminary injunction was
granted, the UFW moved to increase substantially the amount of the
bond, alleging that it intended to invest a significant amount of attorney
time and to incur significant costs in attempting to set aside the injunc-
tion and that its free speech interests would be seriously injured in the
interim. The motion was denied without opinion. The UFW then
litigated the class action aspect of the case to the California Supreme
100. See Asevado v. Orr, 100 Cal. 293, 34 P. 777 (1893).
101. Dickey v. Rosso, 23 Cal. App. 3d 493, 100 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1972).
102. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. UFW, No. 49627 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Super.
Ct., filed Feb. 9, 1973)
103. By contrast, federal courts, in determining their jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1970), have held that a denial of first amendment rights may be worth at least
$10,000. See, e.g., Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1051-53 (3d Cir. 1972); Cortwright
v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972).
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Court, which led CRLDI to obtain a dismissal of that portion of the case
with prejudice. The UFW then sought recovery on the bond. After
establishing that its picketing activities had been enjoined at 2,500 stores
for 435 days and that it had invested 200 attorney hours and more than
$500 in costs in defeating the injunction, the UFW finally recovered the
$1,000.
In one sense, the recovery in California Retail Liquor Dealers was
a victory. In other cases, the treatment of the undertakings when other
cases were terminated proved as arbitrary as the setting of amounts.
When the UFW did move in one case to recover on the undertaking, and
the plaintiff submitted evidence in opposition, the court ignored the
requirement that a trial be set to resolve the dispute, 10 4 and simply
denied the UFW's motion.'0 5 In a number of other cases, the courts by
ex parte orders shortly after dismissals (and well within the four-year
period during which the UFW had a right to seek recovery on the
bonds)' exonerated the bonds or returned the undertakings. 107 The
court clerks seem equally unsure of the correct procedures. In one
county, the clerk was sufficiently unsure of what to do that he wrote to
the attorneys for several plaintiffs asking if he should return the depos-
its. 0 8
The picture presented by the trial courts' treatment of picketing in-
junction cases is bleak. In part this is true because the standards and
procedures applicable to injunctions generally are not appropriate in the
labor dispute context. More frequently, however, the problem stems
from the courts' substantial disregard of those standards and procedures.
The California Supreme Court dealt with some of these abuses in three
recent UFW cases. These decisions are examined next.
104. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 536 (West Supp. 1976).
105. Jones v. UFW, No. 71561 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Feb. 13,
1975).
106. CAL. CODE CxV. PROC. § 337 (West Supp. 1976); Allen v. Pitchess, 36 Cal.
App. 3d 321, 111 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1973).
107. See, e.g., Lamanuzzi & Pantaleo v. UFW, No. 73711 (Tulare County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Aug. 4, 1972); Saikhon v. Chavez, No. 41357 (Imperial County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed June 16, 1970); Carle v. AFL-CIO, No. 94075 (Kern County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Oct. 13, 1965).
108. These letters are included in the files of the following cases: Mel Finerman &
Co. v. UFW, No. 70156 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 3, 1973); Bruce
Church, Inc. v. UFW, No. 70089 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 13,
1973); Bruce Church, Inc. v. UFW, No. 70075 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
June 8, 1973).
The California Supreme Court and
Picketing Injunctions
Prior to 1975 the California Supreme Court had not decided any
cases involving picketing injunctions in the context of farm labor dis-
putes. 10 9 Then, in the space of eight months, the court decided three
such cases. Each case raised a single distinct issue involving the injunc-
tion process, and in each case the court upheld the challenge of the
UFW to the trial court's action. Taken together, the cases demonstrate
a serious concern on the part of the court over the abuses in the area.
Nevertheless, despite the court's occasionally expansive language, the
holdings were narrow and the decisions do not, and probably could not,
alter the basically unsound framework within which the identified abus-
es occurred.
UFW v. Superior Court (William Buak Fruit Co.) 1 °
This case arose out of primary picketing activity at the plaintiffs
ranch. The plaintiff obtained a standard form ex parte TRO against
the UFW. The UFW moved to dissolve the TRO for lack of notice,
and, after the motion was denied, ultimately brought that issue to the
California Supreme Court. The court first found that an injunction
against picketing "affected" or was "in the area of activity protected by
the first amendment.""' It then identified two major defects in ex parte
proceedings affecting such substantial interests. First, the court ob-
served that, particularly in labor dispute cases, the truth is unlikely to
emerge in such a proceeding." 2 Second, the court found that a TRO is
not likely to be drafted in the narrowest terms possible if only one side is
present.1 3  The court then held that first amendment standards re-
quired that the plaintiff make a good faith effort to give notice before
seeking an ex parte TRO affecting first amendment rights.
109. The court had previously decided two UFW cases involving other injunctions.
In one case the court overturned a Jurisdictional Strike Act injunction against boycott
activities on the ground that it was overbroad in that it prohibited publicizing the labor
dispute and engaging in boycott activities. UFW v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 556, 483
P.2d 1215, 94 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1971). In another case, the court held that a Jurisdiction-
al Strike Act injunction could not be granted against the UFW where the employer had
interfered with the rival union by recognizing it even though the employer did not
have a good faith belief that the union enjoyed majority status. Englund v.
Chavez, 8 Cal. 3d 572, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1972).
110. 14 Cal. 3d 902, 537 P.2d 1237, 122 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1975).
111. Id. at 911, 537 P.2d at 1243, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
112. Id. at 908, 537 P.2d at 1241, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
113. Id.
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The holding is not particularly surprising" 4 and was distinctly
foreshadowed by the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess Anne." 5 The ques-
tion is really whether the decision goes far enough. 1 6  First, why the
court held that a "good faith effort" at notice was sufficient is unclear. It
is difficult to imagine how a person subject to ongoing picketing activity
could fail in an attempt to notify the pickets that a restraining order
would be sought. Second, the court said nothing about the crucial
question of timeliness of the notice to be given. Due process requires
that where a person is entitled to an opportunity to be heard, "it is an
opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.""17  Although it was impossible to tell from most
cases studied when notice of the intention to obtain a TRO was given or
attempted, the study contained no case where -notice greater than twen-
ty-four hours was reflected in the record. On the other hand, in many
cases, the dates on the declarations and the number and complexity of
documents filed made it apparent that preparations for the filing and
appearance had begun long before notice was given."' The failure of
plaintiffs' counsel to give sufficient notice of applications for TROs to al-
low the UFW to gather opposing evidence significantly reduced the
likelihood that the UFW could defeat -the application in its entirety and
relegated the UFW attorneys to the position of bargaining about the
terms of the order. No reason appears, apart from possible enforcement
problems, why the court should not have required that counsel give
notice as soon as practicable after the decision to seek the TRO had been
made.
114. The court of appeal, more than four years earlier had ruled similarly. UFW
v. Superior Ct., No. 1542 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist., May 24, 1.971).
115. 393 U.S. 176 (1968).
116. Justice Clark, in dissent, thought that for purposes of a notice requirement first
amendment cases could not be distinguished from other cases where a restraining order
might affect substantial rights. 14 Cal. 3d at 917-18, 537 P.2d at 1247-48, 122 Cal.
Rptr. at 887-88. His position is not without merit, but consideration of proper
procedures in other than labor picketing cases is beyond the scope of this article. See Ex
Parte Temporary Restraining Orders and First Amendment Rights, The Supreme Court
of California 1974-1975, 64 CAL. L. REv. 239, 369-85 (1975).
117. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). See also Roller v. Holly, 176
U.S. 398 (1900).
118. For example, in one case, the plaintiffs filed a 278 page complaint with over
one hundred declarations, some of which were signed as early as a week before filing, yet
the plaintiffs gave less than twenty-four hours' notice of their application for a TRO.
California Retail Liquor Dealers Inst. v. UFW, No. 70708 (Monterey County, Cal.
Super. Ct., Feb. 26, 1974).
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Since the court in the Buak Fruit case was silent on the require-
ments for notice and hearing, the court may well, depending upon the
facts of the case, find insufficient the present procedure of last-minute
notice of an application for a TRO followed by an abbreviated confer-
ence in chambers. Three features of the Buak Fruit decision suggest
that the supreme court might be willing in the future to specify further
requirements to protect the interests of a union involved in picketing the
party seeking the TRO. First, in support of its holding, the court
observed that the terms of the preliminary injunction, issued after an
adversary hearing, were less restrictive -than those of the ex parte TRO
and concluded that the greater restrictions of the latter may have been
due to the lack of procedural safeguards at the TRO stage.'1 9 In
support of that conclusion, -the present study demonstrates that there are
currently insufficient procedural safeguards to insure a "correct" deci-
sion at TRO hearings. Despite the fact that notice and some form of
hearing occurred in the vast majority of the cases, in 65 of the 137 cases
where both a TRO and a preliminary injunction issued (47 percent) the
TRO was more restrictive than the later preliminary injunction. In 53
of the 137 cases (39 percent), both orders were the same. In only 9
cases (7 percent) was the preliminary injunction more restrictive than
the TRO. In the remaining cases, the orders were such that it could not
be said which order was more restrictive.
Second, the court expressly relied for its decision, not only on the
first amendment, but also on article I, section 2 of the California
Constitution. 12  The court had previously held that the free speech
protections of the state constitution were "more definitive and inclusive"
than those of the federal Constitution. 2' The mention of the state
constitution, which was unnecessary to the decision, 122 might suggest
that the court is prepared to afford greater protection to picketing under
the state constitution, although in what manner is not clear. 23
Finally, the court took up a theme that had been raised before by
the court and by commentators: that labor injunctions might not be
119. 14 Cal. 3d at 910 n.8, 531 P.2d at 1242, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
120. Id. at 912, 531 P.2d at 1243-44, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 883-84.
121. Wilson v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr.
468, 472 (1975).
122. Justice Richardson, in concurring, disagreed with this approach because he saw
it as an attempt to forestall review by the United States Supreme Court. 14 Cal. 3d at
915, 537 P.2d at 1245, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
123. See Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal
Ground, 61 CAL. L. REV. 273 (1973).
(Vol 28
PICKETING INJUNCTIONS IN CALIFORNIA
the best way to deal with picketing situations, even where union miscon-
duct is shown.124
We are neither unaware of, nor insensitive to, the possibilities
of violence in labor disputes .... [T]he criminal laws of our state
prohibit violence of the type complained of here, and law enforce-
ment authorities are available to apply those statutes. There is no
reason to believe that criminal sanctions are any less a deterrent
to criminal conduct than mere civil restraint.125
Again, the court's language was vague and laid down no standards for
the trial courts, but it seems a clear warning that courts should seriously
consider other alternatives rather than routinely injecting themselves into
labor disputes through the granting of injunctions. 12  This same theme
was taken up in the next UFW case to appear before the court.
Safer v. Superior Court'2 7
The case arose out of a standard form TRO issued against the
UFW in Ventura County.128  Following the issuance of the TRO,
twenty-two UFW members were arrested and charged under Penal Code
section 166(4)129 (making it a misdemeanor to disobey an "order
lawfully issued by any court") with violating the numbers and spacing
provisions of the TRO. Subsequently (and probably illegally'30), the
trial court, at the behest of the district attorney, ordered the defendants
to appear personally for the dismissal of their criminal cases, at which
124. In Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the
court said: "Injunctions in labor disputes have not generally proved to be an effective
means of settling them; frequently they have aggravated rather than allayed a conflict.
They have the deceptive appeal of the quick and easy and therein lies their danger, for
disputes between workers and employers, now often complicated by internecine disputes
among workers themselves, are not always of a comparable simplicity. There are many
currents of conflict in the mainstream of labor relations, variable, unpredictable, subsid-
ing at times as quickly as they arise. For the most part, they can best be controlled, not
by the courts but by the Legislature, whenever the necessity arises and to whatever
degree the public interest requires." 27 Cal. 2d 599, 608-09, 165 P.2d 891, 897 (1946).
See also Aaron & Levin, supra note 3, at 64; Wrrrn, supra note 3, at 117, 298.
125. 14 Cal. 3d at 914, 537 P.2d at 1245, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
126. See Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 9 Cal. App. 3d 588, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1970)
(injunction denied despite hardship to plaintiff because real solution lies with federal law
enforcement).
127. 15 Cal. 3d 230, 540 P.2d 14, 124 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1975).
128. Frank McGrath Ranch Co. v. Chavez, No. 57087 (Ventura County, Cal.
Super. CL, filed June 6, 1974).
129. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1.66(4) (West 1970).
130. 15 Cal. 3d at 231 n.4, 540 P.2d at 15-16, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 175. See also Mills
v. Municipal Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 288, 304, 515 P.2d 273, 284, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340
(1973).
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time the district attorney served them with an order to show cause in
contempt proceedings instituted under the Code of Civil Procedure. 13 1
The district attorney dismissed the criminal actions, and when he sought
to proceed against the alleged contemnors in the civil action, they raised
numerous challenges to the proceedings. The supreme court, bypassing
perhaps more significant issues, held for the UFW members on the
narrow ground that there was no statutory authorization for the district
attorney to appear in the civil contempt action.
At a minimum, the holding and language of the decision may
reduce significantly the number of contempt actions initiated in the civil
injunction cases.' 32 That the private plaintiffs are not likely to make up
the difference left by the Safer holding is predictable for two reasons.
First, the plaintiff's interest in prosecuting contempt actions is already
minimal. By the time the contempt action is ready to be tried, the
picketing which occasioned the injunction is frequently over, and the
cost of prosecuting the contempt, where a victory does not mean a
recovery for the plaintiff, usually outweighs the abstract satisfaction of
vindicating one's rights. Second, certain language of the court in Safer
may even further dissuade private plaintiffs from bringing contempt
proceedings. Although the court refused to pass on the matter, it
strongly hinted that contempts, like all other crimes in California, might
require a jury trial even when prosecuted in a civil case.' Heretofore,
such contempts have been tried without a jury before the judge issuing
131. The procedures governing arrest, trial, and sentencing of persons charged in a
civil proceeding with contempt of court for violating the terms of an injunction are set
forth in CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1209-22 (West 1972 & Supp. 1976). There has been
much confusion over whether proceedings under these sections constitute "civil" or
"criminal" contempt proceedings. See Safer v. Superior Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 230, 235-36 n.8,
540 P.2d 14, 17, 124 Cal. Rptr. 174, 177. There is no question that these contempt
proceedings, however denominated, arise out of civil litigation, and this fact distinguishes
them from criminal prosecutions under CAL. PEN. CODE § 166(4) (West 1970).
132. In the cases studied, roughly ten civil contempt suits were prosecuted by
district attorneys, the same number as were prosecuted by private plaintiffs. For
examples of cases prosecuted by district attorneys, see Kovacevich v. UFW, No. 122967
(Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 25, 1973); Roberts Farms, Inc. v. UFW, No.
122969 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 25, 1973). For examples of cases
prosecuted by private plaintiffs see Totah v. UFW, No. 689-135 (San Francisco County,
Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 21, 1975); Franzia Bros. Winery v. UFW, No. 113822 (Kern
County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 27, 1973). The district attorney and attorneys for the
plaintiff joined together to prosecute the contempt actions in Dave Walsh Inc. v. UFW,
No. 69750 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 21, 1973).
133. 15 Cal. 3d at 235 n.7, 540 P.2d at 16, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 176; see CAL. CONST.
art. I, -§ 16; CAL. PEN. CODE § 689 (West 1970). In all of the cases studied, UFW
members routinely requested a jury trial of contempt proceedings.
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the underlying order. 134 A jury trial requirement would substantially
increase the cost of prosecution to the plaintiff while rendering a convic-
tion more problematic.
The real significance of Safer may lie in the court's strong condem-
nation of the role played by the state in an essentially private economic
struggle:
This case presents a disturbing instance of intervention by a
public authority in an acrimonious labor dispute. By imposing
the weight of his office and the advantages of the public purse on
the side of management, the district attorney at one stroke relieves
one of the civil litigants of the necessity of financing his half of
the battle, deprives defendants of the right to jury trial which they
enjoyed in the previous criminal presecution, and simultaneously
suggests that public order necessitates management success in this
private civil dispute. From such acts, even when well-intentioned,
spring some of the bitterest chapters in the social history of our
nation.' 3 5
Once it is acknowledged that there is no public interest served by the
district attorney's prosecution of civil case contempt proceedings, it is
difficult to understand how any greater public interest is served, or how
it is any less a case of the "weight of his office" and "the advantages of
the public purse" being imposed on the side of management, when the
district attorney prosecutes alleged violations in criminal proceedings
under Penal Code section 166(4). The study found that most injunc-
tions issued contained a provision declaring the violation of any terms of
the injunction to be a violation of Penal Code section 166(4) and
ordering the sheriff to enforce the injunction. 13 6  Literally thousands of
misdemeanor proceedings were initiated under this section against UFW
members.' 3 7 Where, as in Safer, the conduct which the district attorney
134. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§ 1217-18 (West 1972); see UFW v. Superior Ct.,
265 Cal. App. 2d 212, 71 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1968).
135. 15 Cal. 3d at 242-43, 540 P.2d at 22, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
136. See, e.g., Heggblade-Marguelas-Tenneco, Inc. v. UFW, No. 16940 (Riverside
County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 17, 1973); Kovacevich v. UFW, No. 122967 (Kern
County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 25, 1973). Such an order seems an attempt to put
the state's powers at the disposal of private parties. On occasion, this relationship has
been made even more explicit. At least one district attorney's office undertook to draft
and circulate a "form" injunction for use in civil cases against the UFW. See Murgia v.
Municipal Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 286, 292, 540 P.2d 44, 48, 124 Cal. Rptr. 204, 208 (1975). In
another county, the court, in granting TROs and after directing the sheriff to enforce the
orders, added: "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff compensate the said Sheriff
of Tulare County for his costs and expenses, if any, to the extent that said costs and
expenses exceed the total amount ordinarily incurred by said Sheriff in connection with
the keeping of the peace during the labor dispute which is the subject of this action." S.L.
Douglas, Inc. v. Chavez, No. 71789 (Tulare County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 16,
1971).
137. In the five month period between April 18 and September 18, 1973, 3,385
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol 28
seeks to prosecute is a violation of a numbers and spacing provision
(and therefore would not have been criminal but for a private party's suit
growing out of a private economic struggle), there is little public interest
to be served by the district attorney's intervention. 12 8
UFW v. Superior Court (CRLDI)" 9
This case developed from the UFW's consumer boycott against
Gallo wines. Over one hundred named individual liquor store owners
and a class of approximately 2,000 others, members of the CRLDI, ob-
tained a standard form preliminary injunction.140 The sole issue before
the California Supreme Court was the propriety of granting class relief,
which the UFW contested under the first amendment and general class
action principles. The court held the class action to be improper, but
the basis for its decision was by no means clear.
The UFW asserted that because a picketing injunction covering
absent class members would constitute an impermissible prior restraint
UFW members were arrested. Declaration of Stephen Engelhardt, Sept. 18, 1973,
Franzia Bros. Winery v. UFW, No. 113822 (San Joaquin County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
July 27, 1973).
Not all district attorneys rushed to initiate criminal prosecutions for injunction
violations. In Imperial County, the district attorney was faced with considerable
pressure (including statements to the press) from the plaintiff's attorney in an effort to
get him to prosecute injunction violators. He refused and explained his reasons in a
letter to the court, saying in part: "[The plaintiff's attorney] and I are both officers of
the Court and responsible to the Court for enforcement of its orders. I refuse to be
stampeded by public pressure from [the plaintiff's attorney] or any other source into
pursuing a course of action that is neither in the interest of justice nor in the interest of
the taxpayers of this county." Letter from James E. Hamilton to the Court, Jan. 9,
1973, at 2, D'Arrigo Bros. Co. v. Chavez, No. 43486 (Imperial County, Cal. Super.
Ct., filed Dec. 12, 1972).
138. The logic of the relationship between private and public sanctions in labor
disputes has an Alice in Wonderland quality. The plaintiff seeks an injunction because
unlawful conduct is occurring and the criminal law is not protecting its private interest.
The plaintiff then obtains an injunction against the unlawful conduct and against certain
lawful conduct as well (by means of numbers and spacing provisions). The state, whose
failure to protect the plaintiff's private interest created the need for the injunction in the
first place, then moves to protect the now public interest by arresting those violating the
injunction. The result is to double the risks for the union member in both situations.
The private plaintiff can prosecute those committing crimes in contempt proceedings
without allowing the accused the safeguards he would enjoy in a criminal prosecution.
At the same time, the district attorney can prosecute in criminal proceedings, those
who, but for the injunction in a private suit, are engaging in entirely lawful conduct.
139. 16 Cal. 3d 499, 546 P.2d 713, 128 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1976).
140. Without explaining its reasoning, the trial court denied the injunction sought
on behalf of the larger class of all holders of retail liquor licenses in the state of
California. California Retail Liquor Dealers Inst. v. UFW, No. 70708, at 6 (Monterey
County, Cal. Super. Ct., Feb. 26, 1974) (mem.).
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and would violate the first amendment's requirements of narrowness, a
class picketing injunction should never lie. The court refused to adopt
such an absolute position:
We conclude that although class relief may be appropriate to en-join certain kinds of unlawful labor activities such as violent con-
duct, intimidation of customers, and obstruction of streets, side-
walks and doorways, the complaint before us fails to set forth
sufficient facts to justify the broad injunctive relief sought therein. 41
Thus, the court distinguished between injunctions against unlawfil ac-
tivity and injunctions against lawful activity, i.e., activity which, apart
from the injunction, would not be labeled criminal or tortious, and
implied that only the latter implicated first amendment rights. The
court reiterated the distinction at the end of its opinion:
In the instant case, however, CRLDI's complaint sought to
impose restraints upon lawful, as well as unlawful, labor activity.
As we have explained, in view of the presumptively protected na-
ture of peaceful picketing activity, judicially imposed restraints
upon such activity must be tailored with caution and precision,
and be reserved for those cases in which the threat of harm seems
clear and immient.' 42
Interestingly enough, the court did not even say that the first amend-
ment would always bar class relief against lawful activity, instead nar-
rowly holding: "Under -the circumstances in the present case, we con-
clude that class relief was inappropriate on such a large scale.". 4 3
On the other hand, apart from first amendment considerations, the
court seemed to find the injunction clearly improper under basic class
action principles requiring a community of interest among the members
of the class. First, there was no showing that picketing was imminent at
the stores of all or most of CRLDI's members since there was no
allegation that all sold the boycotted products or that any more than 2
percent of the stores had been picketed or contacted. Second, the
appropriate relief would vary from store to store depending on the
particular labor activity carried on there. Finally, the physical circum-
stances of the stores varied, making a single injunction for all inappro-
priate. Although CRLDI could have corrected the first defect, the
other two defects were inherent in the nature of its class action. Thus, it
is difficult to see how any such class action could survive the court's
holding.
The supreme court's holding with regard to class actions casts
doubt on the propriety of granting mass injunctions regulating lawful
141. 16 Cal. 3d at 501, 546 P.2d at 714, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
142. Id. at 506, 546 P.2d at 717-18, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
143. Id. at 504, 546 P.2d at 716, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
activity in cases involving numerous named plaintiffs jointly suing for
relief. These multi-plaintiff cases present two issues. First, can plain-
tiffs who have not yet been picketed obtain relief if they join in suit with
plaintiffs who have? The court's answer to this question in the CRLDI
case was that stores where no activity had yet occurred were not suffi-
ciently threatened with real and imminent harm and therefore were not
entitled to injunctive relief. 4 ' Second, can a single injunction be
granted to numerous plaintiffs without consideration of their individual
circumstances? As to this issue, the supreme court in the CRLDI case
was concerned that relief be "tailored with caution and precision" to the
activity which had occurred.'4 5 Thus, individualized consideration of
each plaintiff's claim for relief would seem to be required.
The courts of appeal have reached opposite results in two UFW
cases where these issues were presented. In Bosick v. UFW,1 6 the fourth
district court of appeal reversed a preliminary injunction on the ground
that sixty-six of the eighty-seven plaintiffs obtaining relief had produced
no evidence concerning the UFW's activities and on the ground that the
circumstance of the plaintiffs who did produce evidence differed, mak-
ing a single injunction inappropriate. On the other hand, in California
Retail Liquor Dealers Institute v. UFW,1 4 7 decided after the state
supreme court decision, the First District upheld the preliminary injunc-
tion in favor of the seventy-four plaintiffs then remaining in the case,
even though ten had produced no evidence of picketing and even though
the evidence revealed that the circumstances of the plaintiffs differed
markedly.'
The application of the UFW v. Superior Court (CRLDI) prece-
dent to the single plaintiff multilocation type case is more difficult to
anticipate. Although the first amendment requirements of narrowness
and specificity in injunction orders are just as relevant to an injunction
covering many locations about which no proof is presented, there is no
problem of relief being granted to "absent" parties. The Court of
Appeal for the Fifth District, in the only decision to date on the
144. Id.
145. Id. at 506, 546 P.2d at 717-18, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14.
146. No. 10209 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist., Mar. 12, 1971).
147. 57 Cal. App. 3d 606, 129 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1976).
148. The court may simply have not considered the issues since it stated: "UFW's
only objection to the injunction as it applies to the individual plaintiffs is that it sets
forth number and distance restrictions on the mode of picketing." Id. at 611, 129 Cal.
Rptr. at 410.
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question, has held that such an injunction is "obviously invalid" under
the supreme court's decision in the CRLDI case.1 49
The fact that the court -took three picketing injunction cases within
such a short period of time, together with the language used by the court
in deciding the cases, evidences a strong concern to restrain the free-
wheeling conduct of the trial courts in this area. Nevertheless, the
holdings themselves simply do not go to the heart of the problems
identified by the opinions. In fact, the cases reveal that the court
cannot, on a case-by-case basis, eliminate abuses in the trial courts so
long as labor picketing injunctions must be dealt with in the framework
of traditional equitable relief. It remained for the legislature to attempt
to eliminate the abuses of the injunction procedure through special
treatment of the labor dispute situation.
The Legislature and Picketing Injunctions
California's Little Norris-La Guardia Act
Cognizant of the abuses of the injunctions process, the legislature
enacted in 1975 a statute governing the issuance of injunctions in labor
disputes.' This was not the legislature's first venture into the field. In
1903, the legislature passed an "act to limit the meaning of the word
'conspiracy' and also the use of 'restraining orders' and 'injunctions,' as
applied to disputes between employers and employees in the State of
California."' 5 ' The statute was sweeping and barred the issuance of a
restraining order or injunction for acts done or contemplated in relation
to a trade dispute. The answer of the California Supreme Court was
just as sweeping, and in a half sentence three years later, it held the
149. Thriftimart, Inc. v. UFW, No. 2540 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist., filed Apr. 13,
1976).
150. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 527.3 (West Supp. 1976).
151. Cal. Stat. 1903, ch. 235, at 289. The statute read: "No agreement, combina-
tion, or contract by or between two or more persons to do or procure to be done, or not
to do or procure not to be done, any act in contemplation or furtherance of any trade
dispute between employers and employees in the State of California shall be deemed
criminal, nor shall those engaged therein be indictable or otherwise punishable for the
crime of conspiracy, if such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a
crime, nor shall such agreement, combination, or contract be considered as in restraint of
trade or commerce, nor shall any restraining order or injunction be issued with relation
thereto. Nothing in this act shall exempt from punishment, otherwise than as herein
excepted, any persons guilty of conspiracy, for which punishment is now provided by any
act of the legislature, but such act of the legislature shall, as to the agreements,
combinations, and contracts hereinbefore referred to, be construed as if this act were
therein contained; provided, that nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize force
or violence or threats thereof." Id. § I (repealed 1937).
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statute unconstitutional to the extent that it forbade injunctions against
illegal and violent acts, "because violative of plaintiffs constitutional
right to acquire, possess, enjoy, and protect property.' 152
The present statute, 15 3 which copies in purpose the Norris-La
Guardia Act,' begins with a statement of policy which delineates the
need for different treatment of labor dispute cases and which criticizes
the courts for the kinds of abuses documented above. 15 The statute then
goes on to limit strictly the jurisdiction of the courts to issue injunctions
in cases arising out of labor disputes. The statute excepts from its
coverage jurisdictional strike disputes,' 56 suits brought by the Agricul-
tural Labor Relations Board to enjoin unfair labor practices, 15 disputes
between public employees or employers, 55 and suits on collective bar-
gaining agreements 51' Finally, the statute, although barring injunctive
relief in specified circumstances, eschews any intent -to legalize in a
labor dispute conduct which is otherwise made unlawful. 160
The statute adopts word-for-word the broad defintion of "labor
dispute" contained in the Norris-La Guardia Act.' 0 ' Both acts express-
ly apply to situations where the parties do not stand in the relation of
employer and employee, and they therefore limit the courts in granting
injunctions when the dispute involves organizational picketing by an
outside union or when the dispute involves boycott activities. Further-
more, with a few exceptions, both acts limit the granting of injunctions
even where, apart from the act, a court would find the object of the
union's activities to be illegal. Under the Norris-La Guardia Act, courts
have held the object to be irrelevant:
Whether or not the strike in this case is illegal, because of its
purpose, as argued by appellant, is therefore beside the point. The
test is no longer given the uncertain elasticity of "illegality." The
statute, dealing strictly with procedure, nowhere attempts to define
as lawful the acts which it says may not be enjoined.' 62
152. Goldberg, Bowen & Co. v. Stablemen's Local 8760, 149 Cal. 429, 434, 86 P.
806, 808 (1906). See also Pierce v. Stablemen's Local 8760, 156 Cal. 70, 74-75, 103 P.
324, 326-27 (1909).
153. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 527.3 (West Supp. 1976).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 101-15 (1970).
155. This section follows almost exactly the language of a similar New Jersey
statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A, § 15-51 (1952).
156. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1118 (West 1971).
157. CAL. LABOR CODE §9 1160.4, 1160.6 (West Supp. 1976).
158. CAL. GOV'T CODE 9§ 3500-09 (West Supp. 1976).
159. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1126 (West 1971).
160. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 527.3(e) (West Supp. 1976).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1970).
162. Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F.2d 948, 951 (3d Cir. 1939); Yoerg Brewing Co. v.
Brennan, 59 F. Supp. 625, 630 (D. Minn. 1945).
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The California statute differs from the Norris-La Guardia Act in that, in
addition to setting forth jurisdictional limitations on the granting of
injunctions, it declares certain acts legal as a matter of substantive law.
Thus, the statute even more clearly eliminates the old "illegal objects"
test, overturning, in the process, the few outdated cases in which Cali-
fornia courts have previously banned peaceful picketing for an unlawful
object. 1 3
The critical question concerning the statute is to what extent it bars
conduct picketing injunctions.'6 4 Clearly the statute continues to per-
mit the plaintiff to obtain an injunction against the unlawful conduct
itself, but does the statute, upon proof of "fraud, violence or breach of
the peace," permit the granting of- an injunction enjoining not only the
fraudulent or unlawful acts, but otherwise lawful acts as well, i.e., an
injunction against all picketing or a numbers and spacing injunction?
The relevant language is as follows:
[N]o court nor any judge nor judges thereof, shall have jurisdic-
ion to issue any restraining order or preliminary or permanent
injunction which in specific or general terms, prohibits any person
or persons, whether singly or in concert, from . . . (2) Peaceful
picketing or patrolling involving any labor dispute, whether engaged
in singly or in numbers. 165
Given the fact that the overwhelming majority of the injunctions studied
contained numbers and spacing provisions and that, more often than
not, it was those provisions which formed the basis for contempt
proceedings, the question is crucial. No appellate court has dealt with
the issue' 66 and it appears that trial courts are reaching different conclu-
sions. 167 On the plaintiff's side it is argued that the statute is merely a
163. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
164. It is clear that the statute allows an injunction to bar concerted activity
involving "fraud, violence or breach of the peace." CAL. CODE CIrv. PRoc. §
527.3 (b) (1) (West Supp. 1976).
165. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 527.3(b) (2) (West Supp. 1976).
166. In a case decided after the effective date of the statute, the court upheld a
numbers and spacing injunction. California Retail Liquor Dealers Inst. v. UFW, 57 Cal.
App. 3d 606, 129 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1976). However, neither counsel had raised, and the
court never considered, the applicability of the statute.
167. In one recent case, the court, after finding that the union in question had
caused personal injuries, property damage, trespasses, harassment, and threats, denied a
numbers and spacing injunction: "Although the evidence is sufficient to warrant such
an order under pre-existing decisional law, plaintiff's request for an order limiting the
number of persons picketing or assembling in the vicinity of the premises of plaintiff is
denied solely because the Court is of the opinion that it lacks jurisdiction to enter such
an order under the provisions of Section 527.3(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure."
Order for Preliminary Injunction at 5, Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Teamsters Local 186,
No. 111922 (Santa Barbara County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 13, 1976); accord, Lodi
codification of the constitutional requirements and does not prohibit the
courts from issuing injunctions against even peaceful picketing activity
where there has been proof of unlawful activity in the past. On the
union's side it is contended that, irrespective of the proof of past
conduct, the statute bars the issuance of an injunction prohibiting or
regulating in any way peaceful picketing.
A number of factors support the latter interpretation and lead to
the conclusion that the legislature has overturned the Steiner holding
that otherwise lawful activity may be enjoined because of past unlawful
conduct. First, the language of the statute seems clear beyond perad-
venture. The statute prohibits an injunction with certain terms without
regard to the evidence adduced in support thereof-and in particular
bars an injunction against picketing "in numbers." The contrary con-
struction contended for, that the statute merely codifies constitutional
requirements, would render its enactment pointless. Such an interpreta-
tion would be contrary to accepted rules of statutory construction and
contrary to the legislative intent as expressed in its statement of policy. It
would be anomalous indeed to conclude that the legislature, after recit-
ing a litany of complaints as to the present injunction practice, 16
enacted a statute which codified the status quo. The broader "union"
interpretation receives some further support from what little legislative
history there is. The Assembly Committee on Labor Relations, in
presenting arguments in support of the bill, criticized numbers and
spacing orders:
The ability of an employer or law enforcement agency to obtain
a court order which restricts the number and location of pickets
during a strike can so seriously hamper a union's efforts that the
effort of the strike is negated or prolonged unreasonably.1 69
Iron Works, Inc. v. Molders Union, No. 126608 (San Joaquin County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed May 5, 1976) (numbers and spacing preliminary injunction denied); Imperial West
Chem. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 166472 (Contra Costa County,
Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug. 11, 1976) (numbers and spacing TRO denied). Contra,
Associated Freight Lines v. Teamsters Local 287, No. 351770 (Santa Clara County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed May 13, 1976); Associated Freight Lines v. Teamsters Local 150, No.
261035 (Sacramento County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed May 13, 1976).
168. The legislature identified the following defects in the present procedure: "(a)
The status quo cannot be maintained, but is necessarily altered by the injunction. (b)
The determination of issues of veracity and of probability of fact from the affidavits of
the opposing parties which are contradictory and, under the circumstances, untrustworthy
rather than from oral examination in open court, is subject to grave error. (c) The
error in issuing the injunctive relief is usually irreparable to the opposing party. (d)
The delay incident to the normal court of appellate procedure frequently makes ultimate
correction of error in law or in fact unavailing in the particular case." Cal. Stat. 1975,
ch. 1156, § 1, at 2845.
169. Report, Assembly Committee on Labor Relations 2, Aug. 18, 1975.
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Finally, in the event there should be any doubt as to its construction, the
statute itself commands the broader interpretation since it requires that
the provisions be construed "with the purpose of avoiding any unneces-
sary judicial interference in labor disputes.' 170
So construed, the statute will profoundly change the kind of injunc-
tion which may be issued, but, unlike the Norris-La Guardia Act and
similar state statutes, it will in no way modify the procedural aspects of
the injunction process. Unless certain procedural changes are made, the
abuses observed in this study will continue.
Six Proposed Procedural Changes
In order to remedy the present abuses observed in the granting of
picketing injunctions in labor disputes, six procedural reforms are sug-
gested:
1. Oral Testimony. The sine qua non of procedural reform in
this area is the requirement that no preliminary injunction issue except
upon testimony in open court subject to cross-examination. Such a
requirement is contained in the Norris-La Guardia Act' and in numer-
ous similar state statutes.172  As the legislature itself declared in its
statement of policy in this statute:
[A] hearing based upon written affidavits alone and not wholly
or in part upon examination, confrontation and cross-examination,
of witnesses in open court, is peculiarly subject to abuse in labor
litigation .... 173
In light of the drastic effect of interim orders in labor disputes-and in
light of the unlikelihood that any trial will occur-the union is entitled
to full trial procedures at the earlier stage. Of course, a judge who is
determined to issue an injunction may do so after a hearing based on
oral testimony as after a hearing based on affidavits, and for this reason
other reforms are necessary.
2. Individual proof. In order to control the issuance of sweeping
injunctions based on minimal proof, the legislature should require that
no injunction against picketing at any location be issued except on proof
that unlawful acts have occurred and are likely to continue at that
location. The problems with injunctions which sweep too broadly have
170. CAL. COD- Ciy. N~oc. - 527.3 (a) (West Supp. 1976).
171. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
172. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L ws ANN., ch. 214, § 6 (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 206(i) (1964).
173. Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 1156, § 1, at 2845.
been discussed above. The present practice of enjoining picketing
wherever the court concludes picketing is "threatened" simply allows
what should be a narrow and specific injunction to be enlarged into a
mini-statute.
3. Limitations on venue. In order to further limit the issuance of
sweeping injunctions and to prevent the forum shopping which is invited
under present venue rules, the legislature should limit venue for picket-
ing injunction cases to the county in which the injunction is to apply.
Under present venue statutes, it is by no means clear where venue in
such actions does lie. Venue in transitory actions lies wherever the
injury occurred or where a defendant resides.17 1 Venue in local actions
lies wherever the real property which is the subject of the action is
located. 175  The typical picketing case has both transitory and local
elements. It has been held that the tort which is sought to be enjoined
by a picketing injunction is the interference with the plaintiffs advanta-
geous business relationships,' 7 6 a transitory action, and to the extent that
the union's activities are directed against employees or customers, this is
true. However, to the extent that the alleged unlawful activities are
directed against the plaintiff's property itself-e.g., by trespass, blocking
of ingress and egress, and physical damage to the property, growing
crops, or fixtures-the action is local.' 7 7 While it would take a Solomon-
like judgment to determine in these "mixed actions" whether the relief
sought was mainly for the transitory or the local elements,' the policy
of the venue statutes-to identify the most convenient forum 179- would
be better served by requiring that the action be filed in the county where
the unlawful acts occurred and where the property as to which the court
is asked to fashion a decree is situated.
4. Durational limits. The legislature should provide that a pre-
liminary or permanent injunction shall expire six months from the date
of its issue. 180  Similar provisions are contained in the laws of other
174. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 395 (West 1973).
175. Id. § 392.
176. McKay v. Auto. Salesmen's Local 1067, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 106 P.2d 373 (1940).
177. See Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Superior Ct., 265 Cal. App. 2d 1, 71 Cal. Rptr.
202 (1968) (injury to fixtures or crops); San Jose Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. City of San
Jose, 19 Cal. App. 2d 62, 64 P.2d 1099 (1937) (impairment of access to real property);
Coley v. Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 272 P. 1045 (1928) (trespass).
178. See, e.g., 2 B. WrrKIN, CA IFORNuA PROCEDURE, Actions §§ 423-28 (2d ed.
1970).
179. See Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Superior Ct., 265 Cal. App. 2d 1, 3, 71 Cal. Rptr.
202, 204 (1968).
180. At the time of this writing, injunctions were in effect in 113 of the 175 cases
studied, (110 preliminary injunctions, 2 TROs extended by stipulation, and 1 permanent
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states.""' In California, although a TRO may last no more than fifteen
days (twenty days for good cause) unless a hearing is held on a
preliminary injunction,18 2 a preliminary or permanent injunction may
stand indefinitely. The union cannot obtain the dissolution of a prelim-
inary injunction, as a matter of right, until five years have passed, when
the case must be dismissed for lack of prosecution. 83  The union can
never obtain the dissolution of a permanent injunction as a matter of
right. Whatever the value of the present procedure in other cases, the
fast-changing, essentially short-term nature of labor disputes makes it
inappropriate and unnecessary to have old injunctions standing. Un-
ions could, of course, seek to convince the trial courts to use their
discretion to dissolve injunctions'8 4 or dismiss cases for lack of prosecu-
tion (if pending more than two years), 185 but it is just this type of
discretion which has been abused in the past and which should be
limited in labor dispute cases.
5. Realistic bonds. The legislature should set meaningful mini-
mums for bonds on preliminary injunctions. As this study has shown,
the trial courts rendered the bond requirement meaningless by setting
bonds at unconscionably low levels. Either the judges did not take
seriously the possibility that the UFW would prevail in the suit, or they
did not seriously attempt to value the UFW's right to picket in an
unrestricted manner. The legislature could either adopt a flat minimum
for the bond, or set up a sliding scale based on the number of people
enjoined and the number of locations -where the injunction is opera-
tive.'88 In addition to assuring that realistic bonds are set, however, the
legislature should also insure that damages will be collectable. In order
to facilitate recovery on the bonds, the legislature should establish a
presumption that a union whose picketing activities have been wrong-
fully enjoined has been damaged in a flat or per diem amount.
injunction). In 105 of those cases the injunctions were more than two years old, and in
26 cases the injunctions had been handed down more than five years earlier.
181. See, e.g., N.Y. LABOR LAw § 807(-8) (McKinney 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 206 (1964).
182. CAL. CODE CIrv. PRoc. § 527 (West Supp. 1976).
183. rd.
184. In one labor injunction case, the court of appeal upheld the trial court's
dissolution of a preliminary injunction on grounds of staleness when the case was not
brought to trial eight months after the injunction was granted. Harbor Chevrolet Corp.
v. Machinists Local 1484, 173 Cal. App. 2d 380, 343 P.2d 640 (1959).
185. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 583 (West 1976).
186. New York's bond provision appears to follow this pattern, requiring a mini-
mum bond of $1,000 plus $20 per person enjoined up to a maximum of $10,000. N.Y.
LABOR LAw § 807(3) (McKinney 1965). However, for any union of 450 members or
more, the statute in fact sets a flat amount.
6. Criminal safeguards for contempts. Finally, the legislature
should provide that procedures applicable to criminal proceedings, in
particular trial by jury, be employed in contempt (other than coercive
contempt) proceedings arising out of civil cases. The Norris-La Guar-
dia Act' 87 and numerous similar state statutes18 8 provide for jury trial
and other safeguards in contempt cases growing out of injunctions. As
noted above, the injunction process is so intertwined with the criminal
process that it is difficult to justify application of criminal safeguards to
the alleged contemnor charged with a violation of Penal Code section
166(4) when they are denied to the alleged contemnor charged with the
same act in the context of the civil case. The result is even more
anomalous in light of the fact that the alleged contemnor in the civil case
contempt proceeding faces the same judge who issued the injunction and
therefore has greater need of safeguards to insure an impartial ver-
dict.189
Conclusion
The bitter and frequently violent struggle in the last ten years
growing out of the UFW's efforts to organize farm laborers in California
has resulted in an abuse of the picketing injunction matching the abuses
of the federal courts prior to the Norris-La Guardia Act. Whether from
an insensitivity to the limits of judicial authority and wisdom in labor
disputes or from an oversensitivity to political pressures generated by
growers and storeowners, trial judges have repeatedly injected them-
selves into situations where their orders constituted an arbitrary, fre-
quently counterproductive attempt to affect the course of a profound
economic struggle. The general standards governing the granting of
equitable relief are not appropriate for the labor dispute situation, but
even these minimal standards are usually ignored by the trial courts. The
California Supreme Court's attempt in the trio of UFW cases to bring
this situation under control is welcome. It may, however, amount to
nothing more than polishing off the roughest edges of the process. So
long as no changes are made in the fact finding procedures employed
and so long as trial judges are afforded great discretion in fashioning
appropriate relief, 9 ' the mechanism for abuse remains intact. The
187. 29 U.S.C. § 111 (1970).
188. See N.Y. LABOR LAw § 808(1) (McKinney 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §
626(j) (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-56 (1952); Wis. STAT. § 103.60 (1973).
189. There is a right to an impartial judge in contempt proceedings. See Johnson
v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
190. Once the facts have been found adversely to the union, its cause is usually lost:
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legislature's recent attempt to resolve the problem by statute may, if the
statute is interpreted broadly, have a substantial effect on the type of
injunction issued in labor disputes, and thereby on the frequency with
which injunctive relief is sought. However, until substantial procedural
reforms, directed at the peculiar problems of the labor dispute context,
are made in the injunction process, the trial courts will remain largely
insulated from control and therefore free to continue on their present
course. As has been demonstrated time and -time again in the history of
the labor injunction, nothing short of a strong anti-injunction statute can
effectively confine the courts to the very limited role which they can
competently play in the process of labor dispute resolution.
"The trial court was the judge of the credibility of the affidavits and it was its province
to resolve all conflicts." O'Shea v. Tile Layers Union, 155 Cal. App. 2d 373, 377, 318
P.2d 102, 105-06 (1957); Voeltz v. Bakery Workers Union, 40 Cal. 2d 382, 386, 254
P.2d 553, 556 (1953).
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Appendix A
Case Summaries
[This appendix provides an analysis of the 175 labor injunction cases discussed by
Mr. Shatz in the preceding article.]











a. $1,000 or under




3. Injunction presently in effect
a. Issued prior to 1/1/72
b. Issued 1/1/72- 1/1/75
c. Issued since 1/1/75
II. TRO
A. Plaintiff's evidence in support
1. Verified complaint alone
2. Single declaration or less per plaintiff
3. More than one declaration per plaintiff
4. Evidence solely from interested persons
5. In court testimony
6. Any evidence of personal injury or property damage attributable to
UFW
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B. Terms of TRO
1. Prohibitions against blocking, obstructing, trespassing, etc.
2. Prohibitions against threatening, intimidating, harassing, etc.
3. Prohibitions against causing violence, personal injury or property
damage
Ill. Preliminary injunction
A. Plaintiff's evidence in support
1. Verified complaint alone
2. Single declaration or less per plaintiff
3. More than one declaration per plaintiff
4. Evidence solely from interested persons
5. In court testimony
6. Any evidence of personal injury or property damage attributable
to UFW
B. Terms of preliminary injunction
1. Prohibitions against blocking, obstructing, trespassing, etc.
2. Prohibitions against threatening, intimidating, harassing, etc.
3. Prohibitions against causing violence, personal injury or property
damage
IV. Comparison of TRO to later preliminary injunction
A. TRO more restrictive
B. TRO less restrictive
C. Both orders the same
D. Orders not comparable





Z; Name . - o
Alameda
1 Ballantine Produce Co. x x x x x
2 Buttes Gas & Oil Co. x x x x x
3 Arden-Mayfair, Inc. x x
4 Morelli x x x x
Fresno
5 Cal-Mission Orchards x x
6 T. Apkarian & Sons x x x x x
7 Coit Ranch, Inc. x x
8 Vie-Del Co. x x
9 Uchiyama x x x x x
10 Lindgren x x x x x
11 Coit Ranch, Inc. x x x x x
12 Lamanuzzi x x x x x
13 Grumbles x x
14 D'Arrigo Bros. Co. x x x x x
15 Kay-Bee Farms x x x x x
16 Barr Packing Co. x x x x x
17 Tri-Produce x x x x x
18 Asian x x x x x
19 Ballantine Produce Co. x x x x x
20 Harris Farms x x
21 Ruiz x x
22 Pappas & Co. x x x x x
23 ITO Packing Co. x x x x x
24 D'Arrigo Bros. Co. x x x x x
25 Save Mart of Modesto x x x x x
26 Matthews x x x x x
Imperial
27 Abatti Produce, Inc. x x
28 Andrews x x x x x
29 Saikhon x x x x x
30 Andrews x x
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Procedural history TRO
Present status Plaintiff's evidence in support





U UU > 0 '
Alameda
1 x x x x
2 x x x x
3 x
4 x x x x
Fresno
5 x x x
6 x x x x
7 x x x
8 x x x x
9 x x x x
10 x x x x
11 x x x x
12 x x x x
13 x x x
14 x x x x
15 x x x x
16 x x x x
17 x x x x
18 x x x x
19 x x x x
20 x x x x
21 x x x
22 x x x x
23 x x x x
24 x x x x
25 x x x x
26 x x x x
Imperial
27 x x x
28 x x x
29 x x x
30 x x x
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TRO Preliminary injunction
Plaintiff's evid Terms Plaintiff's evidence in support
0 O.= -- .2
0 2 0 - C
Alameda
1 x x x x
2 x x x x x x
3
4 x x x x
Fresno
5 x x x
6 x x x x
7 x x x
8 x x x
9 x x x x x x
10 x x x x x x x
11 x x x x x
12 x x x x x
13 x x x
14 x x x x x
15 x x x x
16 x x x x x x
17 x x x x
18 x x x x x
19 x x x x x x
20 x x x x
21 x x x
22 x x x x x x
23 x x x x x x
24 x x x x x x
25 x x x x
26 x x x x
Imperial
27 x x
28 x x x x
29 x x x x
30 x x
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Preliminary injunction Comparison of TRO to later prelim
Plaintiff's evid Terms
• EE -Z E
Zl rE E E~~
..o o t'
Alameda
1 x x x
2 x x x x x
3
4 x x x x
Fresno
5
6 x x x
7
8
9 x x x x x
10 x x x x x x
11 x x x x
12 x x x x x x
13
14 x x x
15 x x x x x
16 x x x x x x
17 x x x x
18 x x x x x
19 x x x x x x
20
21
22 x x x x x
23 x x x x x
24 x x x x x
25 x x x x
26 x x x
Imperial
27
28 x x x








31 Saikhon x x
32 Abatti Produce, Inc. x x
33 Abatti Farms, Inc. x x x x x
34 D'Arrigo Bros. Co. x x x x x
35 D'Arrigo Bros. Co. x x x x x
36 Jackson Farming Co. x x x x x
37 Nishkian x x
38 Colace Bros. x x
39 Fischer Foods, Inc. x x x x x
Kern
40 Kirkorian x x
41 Missakian x x
42 Caric x x x x x
43 Zaninovich x x x x x
44 Mosesian x x
45 Perreti-Minetti Corp. x x x x x
46 Guimarra Bros. x x x x x
47 Andrews x x
48 Lucky Stores, Inc. x x x x x
49 Central Farms x x x x x
50 White River Farms x x
51 Kovacevich x x x x x
52 Roberts Farms, Inc. x x x x x
53 Kirkorian x x x x x
54 William Mosesian Corp. x x x x x
55 Superior Farming Co. x x x x x
56 Sam Andrews' Sons x x x x x
57 Mettler & Sons x x x x x
58 Frick x x x x x
59 Eugene Nalbandian, Inc. x x x x x
60 American Produce Co. x x
61 Bootlootian x x x x x
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Procedural history TRO
Present status Plaintiff's evidence in support
Inj presently in effect
*00
.0 0 V
I L . c 0 J2. ,-
31 x x x
32 x x x
33 x x x x
34 x x x x
35 x x x
36 x x x x
37 x x x
38 x x x
39 x x x
Kern
40 x x x
41 x x x
42 x x x
43 x x x x
44 x x x
45 x x
46 x x x
47 x x x
48 x x x
49 x x x
50 x x
51 x x x x
52 x x x x
53 x x x x
54 x x x
55 x x x x
56 x x x x
57 x x x x
58 x x x x
59 x x x x
60 x x x
61 x x x x
62 x x x x
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E0 1:60
" 0 Cd -
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31 x x
32 x x
33 x x x x
34 x x x x
35 x x x x x x
36 x x x x x x
37 x x x
38 x x x
39 x x x
Kern
40 x
41 x x x
42 x x x
43 x x x x x x
44 x x x x
45 x x x x
46 x x x x x x
47 x x
48 x x x
49 x x x x x
50 x x x x
51 x x x x x
52 x x x x x
53 x x x x x
54 x x x x
55 x x x x x x
56 x x x x
57 x x x x
58 x x x x x
59 x x x x x x
60 x x x
61 x x x x x x
62 x x x x x x
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31
32
33 x x x
34 x x x x
35 x x x x x
36 x x x x x
37
38




42 x x x
43 x x x x
44
45 x x x x
46 x x x x x
47
48 x x
49 x x x x
50
51 x x x x x
52 x x x x x
53 x x x x x
54 x x x x
55 x x x x x
56 x x x
57 x x x
58 x x x x
59 x x x x x
60
61 x x x x x
62 x x x x x





Z Name 0 - .
63 Delcor Corp. x x x x x
64 Pandol x x x x x
65 Tudor x x x x x
66 Manoogian x x x x x
67 Southern Tulare Farming x x
68 State Market of Delano x x x x x
69 Pacific Farms, Inc. x x
70 Northern Cal. Grocers x x x x x
71 Thriftimart, Inc. x x x x x
Los Angeles
72 Young's Market x x
73 Food Giant Markets x x x x x
74 Alpha Beta Acme x x x x x
75 Pronto Market No. 1 x x x x x
76 Ralph's Grocery Co. x x x x x
77 Safeway Stores, Inc. x x x x x
78 McNeill Bros. Sales x x
79 Boy's Market, Inc. x x x x x
Merced
80 Three Star Farms, Inc. x x x x x
81 Gallo Winery x x x x x
Monterey
82 Inglis Frozen Food x x x x
83 Bruce Church, Inc. x x x
84 Harden Farms x x x x x
85 Horwath & Co. x x x x x
86 D'Arrigo Bros. Co. x x x x x
87 Freshpict Foods, Inc. x x
88 Basic Vegetable Prods. x x x x x
89 Meyer x x x x x
90 Dave Walsh, Inc. x x x x x
91 Albertson's, Inc. x x x x x
92 Bruce Church, Inc. x x x x x
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Procedural history TRO
Present status Plaintiff's evidence in support
Inj presently in effect
00 *
63 a x3 x 0
Cu U' U' >' 0 m
63 x x x
64 x x x x
65 x x x x
66 x x x x
67 x x
68 x x x
69 x x x
70 x x x x
71 x x x x
Los Angeles
72 x x x
73 x x x
74 x x x
75 x x x
76 x x x x
77 x x x
78 x x
79 x x x
Merced
80 x x x
81 x x x x
Monterey
82 x x x x
83 x x x
84 x x x x
85 x x x x
86 x x x x
87 x x x
88 x x x x
89 x x x x
90 x x x x
91 x x x x
92 x x x
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63 x x x x x
64 x x x x x x
65 x x x x x x
66 x x x x x x
67 x x x x
68 x x x
69 x x
70 x x x x x
71 x x x x
Los Angeles
72 x x x
73 x x x x
74 x x
75 x x x
76 x x x x x
77 x x x x x
78 x x x
79 x x x x
Merced
80 x x x x
81 x x x x x x
Monterey
82 x x x x
83 x x x
84 x x x x x
85 x x x x x
86 x x x x x
87 x x x
88 x x x x x x
89 x x x x
90 x x x x x x
91 x x x
92 x x x x x
[Vol 28
March 1977] PICKETING INJUNCTIONS IN CALIFORNIA 855




_S A A) 0
63 x x x x
64 x x x x x
65 x x x x x
66 x x x x x
67
68 x x x x
69
70 x x x x x
71 x x x x
Los Angeles
72
73 x x x x
74 x x
75 x x x
76 x x x x x
77 x x x x x x
78
79 x x x x
Merced
80 x x x x x
81 x x x x x x
Monterey
82 x x x x
83
84 x x x x x x
85 x x x x
86 x x x x
87
88 x x x x x x
89 x x -x x
90 x x x x x
91 x x
92 x x x x





Z Name 0a 0
d
93 Bruce Church, Inc. x x x x x
94 Mel Finerman & Co. x x x x x
95 Montemar Development x x x x x
96 Calif. Retail Liquor Dlrs. x x x x x
97 Jones x x x x x
Riverside
98 Desert Grape Growers x x x x x
99 High & Mighty Farms x x x x x
100 High & Mighty Farms x x x x x
101 Tudor x x x x x
102 Richard Peters Farms x x x x x
103 Coachella-Imperial x x x x x
104 Heggblade-Marguleas x x x x x
105 Melikian x x x x x
106 Laflin x x x x x
107 Mirage Ranch x x x x x
108 Karahadian & Son, Inc. x x x x x
109 Richard Bagdasarian x x x x x
110 Bobara Ranch x x x x x
111 Cy Mouradick & Sons x x x x x
112 Feldstein x x x x x
113 Moreno x x x x x
114 Beckman & Bender x x x x x
115 Valdora x x x x x
116 Carian Enterprises, Inc. x x x x
117 Housing Authority x x x x x
118 Circle K. Corp. x x x x x
San Benito
119 Thomas Castle, Inc. x x x x x
San Diego
120 Egger & Ghio Co. x x x x x
121 Morehouse x x
122 Mar-Crest Liquors x x x x x
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Procedural history TRO
Present status Plaintiff's evidence in support
Inj presently in effect
E- 0
0 0
5- > 0 w 0
93 x x x
94 x x x
95, x x x
96 x x x
97 x x x
Riverside
98 x x x x
99 x x x x
100 x x x x
101 x x x x
102 x x x x
103 x x x x
104 x x x x
105 x x x x
106 x x x x
107 x x x x
108 x x x x
109 x x x x
110 x x x x
III x x x x
112 x x x x
113 x x x x
114 x x x x
115 x x x x
116 x x x x
117 x x x x
118 x x x x
San Benito
119 x x x
San Diego
120 x x x
121 x x
122 x x x x
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z 0 0 .3 . _o
E 0 0~~~
U ~ ___ .~ - M __ Cd0 _ _
93 x x x x x
94 x x x x x x
95 x x x x
96 x x x x x
97 x x x x x
Riverside
98 x x x x
99 x x x x
100 x x x x
101 x x x x x
102 x x x x x
103 x x x x x
104 x x x x x
105 x x x x x
106 x x x x x x
107 x x x x x
108 x x x x x
109 x x x x x
110 x x x x x
111 x x x x x
112 x x x x x
113 x x x x x
114 x x x x x
115 x x x x x
116 x x x x x x
117 x x x x x
118 x x x x x
San Benito
119 x x x x
San Diego
120 x x x x
121 x x x
122 x x x x
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Preliminary injunction Comparison of TRO to later prelim
Plaintiff's evid Terms
Co r. S~ 0 U -.
0 ~ 0
93 x x x x x
94 x x x x x
95 x x x x x
96 x x x x x
97 x x x x x
Riverside
98 x x x x x
99 x x x
100 x x x
101 x x x x
102 x x x x
103 x x x x
104 x x x x x
105 x x x, x x
106 x x x x x
107 x x x x
108 x x x x x
109 x x x x
110 x x x x
111 x x x x
112 x x x x
113 x x x x
114 x x x x
115 x x x x
116 x x x x x
117 x x x x x
118 x x x x x
San Benlto
119 x x x x
San Diego
120 x x X
121







123 Macy's, Inc. x x
124 Ballantine Produce Co. x x x x x
125 Purity Stores, Inc. x x
126 Totah x x x x x
San Joaquin
127 Franzia Bros. Winery x x x x x
128 Herbert Buck Ranches x x
129 Piazza x x




133 Fry's Food Stores, Inc. x x x x x
Santa Barbara
134 Value Fair, Inc. x x x x x
135 Williams Bros. Co. x x x x x
136 Furakawa Farms, Inc. x x x x x
137 Scolari's Markets, Inc. x x x x x
138 George Renna Ent. x x x x x
Santa Clara
139 Aguilar x x x x
140 Fry's Food Stores, Inc. x x x x x
141 H & F Liquors, Inc. x x
142 Steak-Mate, Inc. x x x x
143 Lucky Stores, Inc. x x x x
Santa Cruz
144 William Buak Fruit Co. x x x x x
145 Daylite Market x x
Tulare
146 Bruno Dispoto Co. x x x x x
147 DiGiorgio Corp. x x x
148 Smith's Complete Mkts. x x x x
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Present status Plaintiff's evidence in support
Inj presently in effect
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San Francisco
123 x x x
124 x x x x
125 x x x x
126 x x x x
San Joaquin
127 x x x
128 x x x
129 x x x




133 x x x x
Santa Barbara
134 x x x x
135 x x x x
136 x x x
137 x x x x
138 x x x x
Santa Clara
139 x x x
140 x x x
141 x x x
142 x x x
143 x x
Santa Cruz
144 x x x x
145 x x x
Tulare
146 x x x
147 x x x
148 x x x
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San Francisco
123 x x
124 x x x
125 x x
126 x x x x x x
San Joaquin
127 x x x x x
128 x x x
129 x x x




133 x x x x x
Santa Barbara
134 x x x x
135 x x x
136 x x x x
137 x x x
138 x x x
Santa Clara
139 x x x x x
140 x x x x x
141 x
142 x x x x x
143 x x
Santa Cruz
144 x x x x x
145 x x x
Tulare
146 x x x x x
147 x
148 x x x
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124 x x x
125
126 x x x x x
San Joaquin







133 x x x x
Santa Barbara
134 x x x
135 x x
136 x x x x
137 x x x
138 x x
Santa Clara
139 x x x x
140 x x x x
141
142 x x x x x
143 x x x x
Santa Cruz





148 x x x






Z Name . 2 .
149 Kwock x x x x x
150 S.L. Douglas, Inc. x x x x x
151 George Bros., Inc. x x x x x
152 Lamanuzzi & Pantaleo x x x x x
153 Heggblade-Marguelas x x x x x
154 Peacock x x x x x
155 Hamilton x x x x x
156 Giannini Packing Co. x x x x x
157 Elmco Vineyards, Inc. x x x x x
158 St. Agnes Vineyards x x x x x
159 Cloer x x
160 Kay-Bee Farms x x x x x
161 Asian x x x x x
162 Kaplan's Fruit & Produce x x x x x
163 Frank A. Lucich Co. x x x x x
164 Lawrence Vineyard x x x x x
165 Lucas x x x x x
166 Smith's Complete Mkts. x x x x x
Ventura
167 G. & T. Berry Farms x x x x x
168 Frank McGrath Ranch x x x x x
169 Nakamura x x x x x
170 Cooley x x x x x
171 Anderson x x x x x
172 Mel Finerman Co. x x x x x
173 Northcoast Ventore Corp. x x x x x
174 Martinez x x x x x
Yolo
175 Nor-Cal Growers Assoc.. x x x x x
(173) (171) (141) (138) (79) (53)
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Procedural history TRO
Present status Plaintiff's evidence in support
Inj presently in effect
0 w
149 x x
150 x x x x
151 x x x x
152 x x x
153 x x x"
154 x x x x
155 x x x x
156 x x x x
157 x x x.
158 x x x
159 x x x
160 x x x x
161 x x x x
162 x x x x
163 x x x x
164 x x x x
165 x x x x
165 x x x x
Ventura
167 x x x x
168 x x x x
169 x x x x
170 x x x
171 x x x
172 x x x x
173 x x
174 x x x x
Yolo
175 x x x
(45) (130) (26) (79) (8) (15) (63) (93) (150)
TRO Preliminary injunction
Plaintiff's evid Terms Plaintiff's evidence in support
50 x M
0 >~' > O -
0.0
00 E C~~ .
12x x x x150 x x x x2
151 x x x x x x
152 x x x x x153 x x x x xx
1547 x x x x x
155 x x x x x x159 x x x x
150 x x x x x
151 x x x x x
152 x x x x x x
163 x x x x xx
164 x x x x x x
163 x x x x x x
164 x x x x x
15 x x x x x x
166 enu x x xx
160 r x x x x
167 x x x x
168 x x x x
169 x x x x
170 x x x x x
171 x x x
172 x x x x x x
173 x x x
174 x x x x x x
Yo o
175 x x x x x
(3) (163) (151) (125) (103) (111)
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Preliminary injunction Comparison of TRO to later prelim
Plaintiff's evid Terms
0 M . 2
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Cz .o..
149 x x x
150 x x x x
151 x x x x x
152 x x x x
153 x x x x x
154 x x x x x
155 x x x x x
156 x x x x x
157 x x x x
158 x x x x x
159
160 x x x x
161 x x x x
162 x x- x x x
163 x x x x x
164 x x x xx
165 x x x x x
166 x x x x
Ventura
167 x x x x
168 x x x
169 x x x x
170 x x x x x
171 x x x
172 x x x x x
173 x x x
174 x x x x
Yoo
175 x x x x x
(20) (132) (122) (106) (65) (9) (53) (10)
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Appendix B
Citations for Cases Found in Appendix A
Alameda County
1. Ballantine Produce Co. v. UFW, No. 383764 (Alameda County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Oct. 10, 1968).
2. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. UFW, No. 428807 (Alameda County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Apr. 26, 1973).
3. Arden-Mayfair, Inc. v. UFW, No. 446688-0 (Alameda County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Mar. 1, 1974).
4. Morelli v. UFW, No. 459867-7 (Alameda County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Jan. 24,
1975).
Fresno County
5. Cal-Mission Orchards v. UFW, No. 145105 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
May 19, 1970).
6. T. Apkarian & Sons v. UFW, No. 145446 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
June 15, 1970).
7. Cot Ranch, Inc. v. UFW, No. 146201 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug.
13, 1970).
"8. Vie-Del Co. v. UFW, No. 148205 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Feb. 8,
1971).
9. Uchiyama v. UFW, No. 149401 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed May 13,
1971).
10. Lindgren v. UFW, No. 149780 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 10,
1971).
11. Coit Ranch, Inc. v. UFW, No. 150621 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug.
13, 1971).
12. Lamanuzzi v. UFW, No. 155534 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Sept. 1,
1972).
13. Grumbles v. UFW, No. 158232 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Mar. 27,
1973).
14. D'Arrigo Bros. Co. v. UFW, No. 145473 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
June 16, 1973).
15. Kay-Bee Farms v. UFW, No. 159860 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July
13, 1973).
16. Barr Packing Co. v. UFW, No. 159886 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
July 16, 1973).
17. Tri-Produce v. Chavez, No. 159904 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July
17, 1973).
18. Asian v. UFW, No. 159910 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 17, 1973).
19. Ballantine Produce Co. v. UFW, No. 159927 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed July 18, 1973).
20. Harris Farms v. UFW, No. 159975 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July
20, 1973).
21. Ruiz v. UFW, No. 160002 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 24, 1973).
22. Pappas & Co. v. UFW, No. 160064 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 27,
1973).
23. ITO Packing Co. v. UFW, No. 160071 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
July 28, 1973).
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24. D'Arrigo Bros. Co. v. UFW, No. 160268 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct. filed
Aug. 10, 1973).
25. Save Mart of Modesto v. UFW, No. 161615 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. CL, filed
Nov. 20, 1973).
26. Matthews v. UFW, No. 161988 (Fresno County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 12,
1973).
Imperial County
27. Abatti Produce, Inc. v. Chavez, No. 41328 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
June 4, 1970).
28. Andrews v. Chavez, No. 41353 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 12,
1970).
29. Saikhon v. Chavez, No. 41357 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. CL, filed June 12,
1970).
30. Andrews v. Chavez, No. 41366 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 15,
1970).
31. Mario Saikhon, Inc. v. Chavez, No. 41370 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
June 16, 1970).
32. Abatti Produce, Inc. v. Chavez, 41659 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct., Oct. 6,
1970).
33. Abatti Farms, Inc. v. Chavez, No. 41904 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Jan. 22, 1971).
34. D'Arrigo Bros. Co. v. Chavez, No. 43486 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Dec. 7, 1972).
35. D'Arrigo Bros. Co. v. Chavez, No. 44424 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Nov. 11, 1973).
36. Jackson Farming Co. v. Chavez, No. 44626 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Feb. 20, 1974).
37. Nishkian v. Chavez, No. 44921 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 7
1974).
38. Colace Bros. v. Chavez, No. 44925 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed June
10, 1974).
39. Fischer Foods, Inc. v. UFW, No. 45706 (Imperial County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Feb. 24, 1975).
Kern County
40. Kirkorian v. AFL-CIO, No. 93375 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug. 2,
1965).
41. Missakian v. AFL-CIO, No. 93952 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 1,
1965).
42. Caric v. AFL-CIO, No. 94075 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 13, 1965).
43. Zaninovich v. Agricultural Workers Organizing Comm., No. 94107 (Kern County,
Cal. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 15, 1965).
44. Mosesian v. AFL-CIO, No. 97360 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 19,
1966).
45. Mario Perreti-Minetti Corp. v. UFW, No. 97623 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Nov. 11, 1966).
46. Guimarra Bros. Fruit Co. v. UFW, No. 100011 (Kern County, Cal. Super. CL,
filed Aug. 7, 1967).
47. Andrews v. Chavez, No. 110491 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Sept. 3,
1970).
48. Lucky Stores, Inc. v. UFW, No. 111389 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Sept.
25, 1970).
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49. Central Farms v. Chavez, No. 111856 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Nov.
19, 1970).
50. White River Farms v. UFW, No. 120189 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Sept. 8, 1972).
51. Kovacevich v. UFW, No. 122967 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 25,
1973).
52. Roberts Farms, Inc. v. UFW, No. 122969 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Apr. 25, 1973).
53. Kirkorian v. UFW, No. 123371 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed May 5, 1973).
54. William Mosesian Corp. v. UFW, No. 123443 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed June 4, 1973).
55. Superior Farming Co. v. UFW, No. 123562 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
June 11, 1973).
56. Sam Andrews' Sons v. Chavez, No. 123888 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
June 28, 1973).
57. Mettler & Sons v. Chavez, No. 123961 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 3,
1973).
58. Frick v. UFW, No. 124018 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 6, 1973).
59. Eugene Nalbandian, Inc. v. UFW, No. 124128 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
July 13, 1973).
60. American Produce Co. v. UFW, No. 124221 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
July 20, 1973).
61. Bootlootian v. UFW, No. 124378 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed July 30,
1973).
62. Guimarra Vineyards Corp. v. UFW, No. 124403 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed July 31, 1973).
63. Delcor Corp. v. UFW, No. 124436 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug. 2,
1973).
64. Pandol v. UFW, No. 124576 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug. 9, 1973).
65. Tudor v. UFW, No. 124639 (Kern County, Cal., Super. Ct., filed Aug. 14, 1973).
66. Manoogian v. UFW, No. 124641 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug. 14,
1973).
67. Southern Tulare Farming Co. v. UFW, No. 124745 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Aug. 21, 1973).
68. State Market of Delano, Inc. v. UFW, No. 126586 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Jan. 16, 1974).
69. Pacific Farms, Inc. v. Chavez, No. 129220 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
July 3, 1974).
70. Northern Cal. Grocers Ass'n v. UFW, No. 130413 (Kern County, Cal. Super.
Ct., filed Sept. 6, 1974).
71. Thriftimart, Inc. v. UFW, No. 130804 (Kern County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Sept.
27, 1974).
Los Angeles County
72. Young's Market v. UFW, No. 899534 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Dec. 13, 1966).
73. Food Giant Markets, Inc. v. UFW, No. 941805 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Super.
Ct., filed Oct. 24, 1968).
74. Alpha Beta Acme Markets, Inc. v. UFW, No. 986953 (Los Angeles County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Oct. 2, 1970).
75. Pronto Market No. 1, Inc. v. UFW, No. 18457 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Super.
Ct., filed Dec. 14, 1971).
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76. Ralph's Grocery Co. v. UFW, No. C 21442 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Jan. 26, 1972).
77. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. UFW, No. C 49627 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Feb. 9, 1973).
78. McNeill Bros. Sales v. UPFW, No. 117330 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Mar. 12, 1975).
79. Boy's Market, Inc. v. UFW, No. C 130900 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed July 24, 1975).
Merced County
80. Three Star Farms, Inc. v. UFW, No. 46439 (Merced County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Aug. 20, 1973).
81. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. UFW, No. 46512 (Merced County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Aug. 30, 1973).
Monterey County
82. John Inglis Frozen Food Co. v. UFW, No. 68075 (Monterey County, Cal. Super.
Ct., filed Aug. 28, 1970).
83. Bruce Church, Inc. v. UFW, No. 68093 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Sept. 3, 1970).
84. Harden Farms v. UFW, No. 68110 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Sept.
14, 1970).
85. Horwath & Co. v. UFW, No. 68116 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Sept. 15, 1970).
86. D'Arrigo Bros. Co. v. UFW, No. 68163 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed
Oct. 2, 1970).
87. Freshpict Foods, Inc. v. UFW, No. 68164 (Monterey County, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Oct. 2, 1970).
88. Basic Vegetable Products Corp. v. UFW, No. 68827 (Monterey County, Cal. Super.
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